Houchins v. KQED Inc. by Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Washington and Lee University School of Law
Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons
Supreme Court Case Files Powell Papers
10-1977
Houchins v. KQED Inc.
Lewis F. Powell Jr.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles
Part of the First Amendment Commons
This Manuscript Collection is brought to you for free and open access by the Powell Papers at Washington & Lee University School of Law Scholarly
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Supreme Court Case Files by an authorized administrator of Washington & Lee University School of
Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@wlu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Powell, Lewis F. Jr., "Houchins v. KQED Inc." (1977). Supreme Court Case Files. 598.
https://scholarlycommons.law.wlu.edu/casefiles/598
PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
May 12 Conference 
List 1, Sheet 2 
No. 76-1310 CFX 
HOUCHINS . [sheriff] 
INC. 
Cert to CA 9 (Pregerson [by 
desig.]; Duniway, concurring 
Hufstedler, concurring specie 
Federal/Civil 
Timely 
1. SUMMARY. This petn presents the question whether the 
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of petr's policy of refusing the _press (or anyone else) access 
to the prison to observe conditions, interview inmates, or 
take photographs. KQED's interest in obtaining access to the 
jail arose from a prison psychiatrist's report that conditions 
in the prison were responsible in part for a prisoner's suicide. 
After the suit was filed, petr initiated a series of guided 
tours of the prison for the public. At first the tours were 
' 
given monthly on a first-come first-serve basis and were limited 
to 25 persons; the tours for 1975 were filled within a week.* 
The tourists did not see all the prison (the allegedly notorious 
"Little Greystone" building and the "disciplinary cells" were 
excluded), were not allowed to speak to inmates, and were 
not permitted to take photographs. (The sheriff, however, did 
_offer a set a photographs for sale.) Representatives of the 
press were permitted on the tours only if they signed up in 
time, which did not permit the press access in resp~nse to 
a newsworthy event. And, of course, the lack of opportunity 
to photograph conditions and interview inmates made the tours 
inadequate for media purposes. 
Petr emphasizes that there is some access to information about 
the prison that is extended to the public and press on equal 
terms: First, there is no limit on the mail that an inmate can 
send or receive. Second, sentenced inmates may pe visited 
for a 3-hour period on each Sunday; the only restriction on 
visitors concerns juveniles and those previously incarcerated. 
Third, inmates in the maximum security facility may make unmonitore 
* Petr indicates that in 1976 the tours were given semi-monthly 
and were expanded to 30 persons. Petr claims there has been 






collect calls without restriction. Fourth, there are the 
public tours, described above. 
The DC entered a preliminary injunction ordering the petr 
to allow "full and accurate coverage of the conditions" 
in the prison by KQED and other respons ible representatives 
of the news media. The press was to be given access to all 
Santa Rita facilities "at reasonable times and hours," and 
were to be allowed to use sound and photographic equipment and 
to interview inmates. The petr was allowed to exclude the press, 
however, "for the limited periods when tensions in the jail 
make such media access dangerous." 
I 
CA 9 affirmed. The panel found somewhat of a stumbling block 
the Court's observation in Pell v. Procuni.er, 417 ~ .s. 817,-
; 834 (1974), that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access 
to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general 
public." Tllre panel decision by DJ Pendergast took the approach { 
that the DC had impl i citly found that the rights of - - both the · 
public and the press were infringed by the petr's policies. 
In his view, Ml did not require that equal access be implemented 
identically for press and public and hence the DC did not err 
in referring only to the press in its preliminary order. Judge 
Duniway, concurring, found the language ·from Pell troubling, but 
observed that the law ought to recognize that the administrative 
problems associated with the admission of the press are 
different from those governing the public. Judge Hufstedler, 
concurring specially, indicates that although ~he press has no . 




right to information barred from the public generally, 
regulations may appropriately differentiate between public 
and press with regard to the means by which information 
to which the public is entitled is gathered. 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist granted a stay of the preliminary 
injunction on request of the petr pending the disposition of 
the instant petn, noting ' the "departure from the unequivocal 
language of one of our opinions which on its fac e appears to 
govern the question." 
3. CONTENTIONS. Petr argues that the DC and the CA 
departed from the teaching of Pell and Saxbe v. Washington 
Post Co., 417 U.S. 843 (1974), in extending the press 
greater access to the prison than that provided to the public. 
Petr claims that the public access allowed by mail, telephone, 
visits to inmates, and the public tours is adequate to satisfy 
the public's need to know. Requiring further access might 
disrupt the prison. 
Respsargue that neither Pell nor Saxbe is in conflict with 
the decision below; both dealt only with a prison rule 
prohibiting interviews with specific individual inmates, an 
issue not involved here. Moreover, in Pell the Court noted 
that the public and press were given "full opporturiity" to 
observe prison conditions; newsmen could visit both the 
maximum and minimum security sections and could interview 
randomly selected inmates. 417 U.S., at 830. In Saxbe 
the Court emphasized the "substantial access" allowed the 





members of the press to observe ~nd to report conditions; 
ne~smen could tour and photograph the facilities and could 
interview the inmates they encountered. 417 U.S., at 847. 
Resps , also, note that several other jails in the area have 
free press access and that the access . has created no problems. 
Finally, resps . note that the injunction is only a preliminary 
order and the difficulties, if any, in allowing press access 
may serve to alter the issue before the litigation goes to 
final judgment. 
4. DISCUSSION. The preliminary injunction does seem 
contrary to the observation in Pell that the newsgathering 
rights of the press are no greater than those of the public. 
However, both Saxbe and Pell may be impliedly limited to --
situations in which there is already substantial press 
and public access to information. If so, this case 
presents a very different issue than that considered in those 
cases in light of the limited access to Santa Rita. 
If one assumes that the public has a right to know about 
.prison conditions, · - <' .: : . ~.-,_, v the . suggestion that the 
means of access to that information provided the press may 
differ from those extended the public seems a sensible response 
to the practicalities of the situation to me. 
There is a response. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell November 27, 1977 
From: Jim Alt 
No. 76-1310, Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974), the 
Court held that prison regulations prohibiting news 
reporters from conducting face-to-face interviews with 
inmates of their choice did not violate either the 
prisoners' or the reporters' First Amendment rights. The 
Court's rationale for the second branch of its holding was 
that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to 
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general 
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Post Co., 417 U.S. 843, 850 (1974). Because the general 
public was not permitted to interview selected inmates, 
newsmen did not have a First Amendment right to do so. 
You wrote a strong dissent on this point, arguing 
that the "constitutionally established role of the news 
media" is to "act[ ] as an agent of the public at large" 
in gathering and reporting the news; that reporters, as 
agents for the public, therefore have a right to greater 
access to prisons than the public at large, which 
necessarily is excluded from prisons; and that limitations 
on that right intended to protect legitimate needs of the 
prison must be no more restrictive of the reporters' First 
Amendment function than is necessary to protect those 
needs. Saxbe, supra, at 850-875 (Powell, J. dissenting). 
In the instant case, the DC ordered the Sheriff 
of Alameda County, California, to grant "responsible 
representatives of the news media" access to the county 
jail at Santa Rita "at reasonable times and hours," and to 
permit those representatives to use "photographic and 
sound equipment" and to interview inmates, so that the 
media could provide "full and accurate coverage of the 
Santa Rita facilities." Pet.App. at 27-28. The court 
order allows the Sheriff to deny access during "those 
limited periods when tensions in the jail make such media 
access dangerous," id. at 28, and the DC opinion states 
that the "specific methods of implementing" press access 
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At the time the DC issued its order, the general 
public's access to the Santa Rita jail consisted of one 
tour a month for a group of 25 people, with reservations 
on a first-come, first-served basis. Members of the tours 
were not permitted to take any pictures or to speak with 
any inmates. Thus, on its face, the DC order grants 
newsmen a "right of access to prisons [and] their inmates 
beyond that afforded the general public," in apparent 
disregard of Pell and Saxbe. CA9 nonetheless upheld the 
order, with each of three judges on the panel writing 
separately. Id. at 1-4 (Pregerson, District Judge), 21-22 
(Duniway, Circuit Judge), 23-26 (Hufstedler, Circuit 
Judge). 
The question for the Court, to my mind, is 
whether the facts of this case differ so compellingly from 
the facts of Pell and Saxbe as to justify distinguishing 
those cases here. Most of this memo therefore will be 
devoted to considering the various distinctions offered by 
the respondents here and the courts below. If this case 
is not fairly distinguishable from Pell and Saxbe, the 
question for you will become whether to adhere to the 
position you took in those cases. 
I. DISTINGUISHING PELL AND SAXBE. 
A. There is less press access to the jail here 
than in Pell and Saxbe. Mr. Justice Stewart, writing for 
the Court in Pell, began his discussion of the reporters' 







face-to-face interviews with prisoners this way: 
"We note at the outset that this regulation 
[banning face-to-face interviews with selected 
inmates] is not part of an attempt by the State 
to conceal the conditions in its prisons or to 
frustrate the press' investigation and reporting 
of those conditions. Indeed, the record 
demonstrates that, under current corrections 
1 policy, both the press and the g eneral p ublic are accorded -full - opportunit i es to observe pr1sd n conditions. The Department of Corrections regularly conducts tours through the prisons for 
L- the benefit of interested citizens. In addition, 
e,y news,m,en ~ re 2ermit ted t o ~isit both the maximum 
secur i ty and mi n i mum securit y sections of the 
institutions and to stop and speak about any 
subject to any inmates whom they might 
encounter. If security considerations permit, 
corrections personnel will step aside to permit 
such interviews to be confidential. Apart from 
general access to all parts of the institutions, 
newsmen are also permitted to enter the prisons 
to interview inmates selected at random by the 
corrections officials. By the same token, if a 
newsman wishes to write a story on a particular 
prison program, he is permitted to sit in on 
(!)( 
group meetings and to interview the inmate 
participants. In short, members of the press I 
enjoy access to California prisons that is not 
available to other members of the public." 
417 U.S., at 830-831. Justice Stewart made similar 
observations about the public's and press' access to the 
federal prisons involved in Saxbe. 417 U.S., at 847-848. 
Respondents argue that th~s case differs from 
Pell and Saxbe because neither the public nor the press is - ... -
given significant access to the Santa Rita jail. Indeed, 
___.....---..., ....., awwwa~ .-
there are strong indications that the Sheriff is trying 
"to conceal the conditions in [the] prison [and] to 
frustrate the press' investigation and reporting of those 
conditions." Consider these facts: 
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as a matter of "policy," to allow the anchorman of 
nonprofit TV station KQED's local news program to 
investigate the circumstances and inspect the scene of a 
suicide at the Santa Rita jail in March of 1975. The 
suicide took place inside a facility at Santa Rita called 
"Greystone" where, in 1972, a federal court had found 
conditions so "truly deplorable" as to constitute cruel 
and unusual punishment. Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F.Supp. 
128, 132-133 (N.D. Cal. 1972). Having been rebuffed in 
his attempt to gain access to the jail, the anchorman 
tried without much success to cover the story of the 
suicide by reporting on the county Board of Supervisors' 
investigation of jail conditions and on a public debate on 
whether to build a new jail. 
Finally, on June 17, 1975, the anchorman filed 
this lawsuit. At that time neither the press nor the 
~ general public was allowed any access whatever to the 
~ Santa Rita jail, although prisoners could receive personal 
visitors for a few hours a week, could send and receive 
mail, and could make some telephone calls. But 
miraculously, two days after the suit was filed, the 
Sheriff submitted a plan to the Board of Supervisors to 
take a group of 25 members of the general public through 
the jail once a month. But, respondents emphasize, even 
this plan, which the Supervisors approved on June 14, 
falls far short of providing either the public or the 








emphasized so heavily in Pell and Saxbe. 
First of all, members of the press still are all 
but excluded from access to the jail by the tours' 
...... -- -- ------ .. 
first-come- first-served reservation policy. The tours 
were filled for six months within a week of their 
announcement. Moreover, neither the members of the press 
who are lucky enough to get a reservation for a tour, nor 
members of the general public who go on the tours, are 
permited to speak with any inmates; to take any 
photographs; or to view the infamous "Little Greystone" 
facility. In fact, the Sheriff requires that inmates be 
be kept entirely out of sight of the tour members. 
Although the Sheriff offers for sale a series of 20 photos 
of the jail for $2 apiece, these photos were taken at 
places and times selected by jail authorities, and they 
cannot be expected fairly to depict typical conditions at 
the jail. And monthly tours cannot possibly enable the 
press to cover stories at the jail as they break. 
In view of all this, respondents argue, the 
"Court's 'no special access to information' statement [in 
Pell and Saxbe] must be read in the context of prisons 
that already permitted very substantial press access." Br. 
for Resps. at 29. 
"[T]he no-interview rule in Pell and Saxbe was 
upheld only on a record showing that reporters in 
fact had substantial access to the prisons, 
access reasonably sufficient to insure against 
concealment of conditions or events of public 
concern. As the district court noted in the 






the same sought by KQED. Thus, KQED can be 
granted all the relief it seeks and will have no 
more access than the press had in Pell-Saxbe. The 
district court order is consistent with the 
holdings in those cases." (Br. for Resps. at 
30-31) • 
Petitioner's answer is twofold. First, Pell and 
Saxbe did lay down a rule of general applicability, that 
the press is entitled to no greater access to prisons than 
the public. Even if the press has less access here than 
it did in Pell and Saxbe, it is entitled to no more than 
the public here receives. Second, a number of alternative 
means for obtaining information about jail conditions are 
available to the press here, in addition to the public 
tours. Inmates can send and receive an unlimited number 
of letters, to and from reporters as well as anyone else. 
Anyone, including reporters, can visit friends who are 
inmates during regular visiting hours. Pre-trial 
detainees can be interviewed by the press with the consent 
of the detainee, his attorney, and the judge who has 
jurisdiction over hius case. Sentenced inmates can be 
interviewed upon their release. In Saxbe, the Court took 
note of similar alternative channels of communication that 
were open between inmates and the press. 417 U.S., at 
847-848 (noting availability of communication by mail and 
possibility of interviewing recently released inmates). 
Such alternative means are no less relevant in considering 
the rights of the press here. 
Respondents reply that the Court has been less 





alternative means of communication in First Amendment 
cases since Pell and Saxbe. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. 
Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977); Virginia Pharmacy 
Board v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 
757-758 n.15 (1976). And these alternatives plainly are 
less effective than timely, on-the-spot reporting. See 
Br. for Resps. at 57-61. 
8. 
Discussion. I think the chickens have come home 
to roost for the majority in Pell and Saxbe. As you warned 
there, 
"From all that appears in the Court's opinion, 
one would think that any governmental restriction 
on access to information, no matter who severe, 
would be constitutionally acceptable to the 
majority so long as it does not single out the 
media for special disabilities not applicable to 
the public at large." 
417 U.S., at 857 (Powell, J., dissenting). Respondents 
have a good argument that they are much less able to 
report effectively on conditions and events at the Santa 
Rita jail than were the media parties in Pell and Saxbe. 
Their argument for greater access than is accorded the 
public is correspondingly stronger. But as I read Justice 
Stewart's opinions in Pell and Saxbe, the majority would 
not recognize this difference. Indeed, under the 
majority's rationale, the result would be the same if the 
Sheriff had continued to bar the public and the press from 
the jail altogether, instead of instituting his tour 
program. 







Saxbe (Stewart, Burger, White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist), I 
would seize this opportunity to disavow the notion that 
the press never can have a right to greater access to 
information or events than is granted the public. As you 
showed in Saxbe, 417 U.S., at 857-860, this doctrine 
sprang full-blown in Pell from comments that were 
unnecessary to decision in Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 
16-17 (1965), and Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 
684-685 (1972). Sound doctrine would hold that where, as 
in the case of prisons, there are good reasons not to 
admit all interested members of the general public to a 
place, but where there is a need for public information 
about that place, that is precisely the situation where 
~
the press should be given a right of access that is 
general public's. In this way, the 
'uwa,,,_,:.ws:..., _, 
press can serve as a conduit to the public for information 
that the public itself, for legitimate reasons, is 
prevented from gathering. But I preach to the converted. 
I also would have nothing to do with the notion 
that a restraint on the use of a particular means either 
of gathering or of transmitting information can be 
justified because other, less effective means are 
available. The logic of that notion pushes one toward the 
position that any restriction on a particular means is 
permissible, as long as some other marginally effective 
means is available. But, as Justice Stewart once wrote in 







any medium of communication the burden of justifying its 
presence is contrary to where I had always thought the 
presumption must lie in the area of First Amendment 
freedoms." Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 615 
10. 
(1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting). Alternative means usually 
are invoked to make more palatable a decision that already 
has been reached, i.e., that use of the particular means 
for which protection is claimed may constitutionally be 
prohibited. But one should not confuse the considerations 
that properly go into deciding whether a particular means 
can be banned, and the rhetoric by which that decision is 
sugar-coated. 
I do not know whether it would be possible to get 
a Court to distinguish Pell and Saxbe on the ground that 
members of the press did have substantial access to the 
prisons there, even without the face-to-face interviews 
that they sought. Your notes from the discussion of Saxbe 
at Conference seem to suggest that this factor might have 
influenced the votes of Justices Stewart and White, 
although Justice Stewart's opinion for the Court certainly 
sounds absolutist to me. On the other hand, Justice 
Marshall, who joined your dissent in Saxbe, is out of this 
case (presumably because the NAACP is a party). I would 
not hazard a prediction as to Justice Stevens' position, 
although he did once write in dicta, Morales v. Schmidt, 
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"Before a democratic society can effectuate 
drastic institutional changes, the community at 
large must be informed about the need for 
change. That there is inadequate public 
awareness of the nature of our penal system, and 
that the system as a whole needs to be changed 
dramatically, are propositions which correctional 
officials are not likely to challenge .... If the 
reasons for our faith in the principles embodied 
in the First Amendment are valid, it is not 
unreasonable to infer that there is a causal 
connection between those two propositions." 
B. There is less showing of justification for the 
limitation here than in Pell or Saxbe. In Pell, Justice 
Stewart also set forth the reasons for the State's 
proscription of newsmen's face-to-face interviews with 
selected inmates: 
"[T]he policy [of permitting face-to-face 
interviews] had resulted in press attention being 
concentrated on a relatively small number of 
inmates who, as a result, became virtual 'public 
figures' within the prison society and gained a 
disproportionate degree of notoriety and 
influence among their fellow inmates. Because of 
this notoriety and influence, these inmates often 
became the source of severe disciplinary 
problems." 
417 U.S., at 831-832; accord, Saxbe, 417 U.S., at 848-849. 
Here, on the other hand, respondents do not seek the right 
to conduct face-to-face interviews with preselected 
inmates; and the random interviews that they do seek to -conduct are, as the DC found, unlike to produce jail 
"celebrities." Pet.App. at 32. The Sheriff professes fear 
that allowing newsmen to take photos will compromise jail 
security because they might take photos of locks. But 
wardens of other prisons where newsmen are allowed access 






rules against photographing locks, nor cause any other 
problems. The Sheriff argues that allowing press access 
would 
"interfere with the facility's schedule, 
involving the frequent movement of inmates to and 
from classes, court, work and meals; would 
require locking up all inmates upon the entrance 
of visitors into the facility; would necessitate 
enhanced security procedures to monitor the flow 
of visitors and their belongings into the jail; 
would increase inmate tensions; and would imperil 
the continued viability of security devices 
presently extant in the jail." 
Br. for Petr at 23. But this simply is not so. Many 
civilians come and go every day at the jail without the 
necessity of locking up all the inmates or delaying their 
movements. The experience at San Quentin suggests that 
there will not be many press requests for access, so that 
the burden of searching additional visitors will not be 
great. Respondents do not seek guided tours for large 
groups; all they want is occasional access to cover 
particular stories. 
Discussion: These are the kinds of concerns that 
are quite difficult for a court to evaluate, as all 
members of the Pell Court acknowledged. One might 
reasonably think that if the state and federal prisons 
involved in Pell and Saxbe did not find it unduly 
burdensome or dangerous to allow the same access as is 
sought here, the Sheriff's cries of impend ing doom should 
not carry much weight. Moreover, it appears that some 
other county jails in the San Francisco area find it 









here. See App. 9-10 (list of stories KQED has done from 
jails); 13-14 (newsman's account of producing live TV 
program from San Francisco county jail); 14-15 (San 
Francisco County Sheriff's account of same program); Br. 
for Petrs at 10-12. 
On the other hand, the county jail here may 
operate on a tighter budget than the institutions in Pell 
and Saxbe. I imagine that some additional employee-time 
would be required at the jail when the press comes to 
call, because a jail employee would have to accompany 
newsmen whereever they went. And it might be true that 
all movements of inmates would have to cease whenever a 
newsman visited although I doubt it. 
My own view is that, judging by other prisons' 
experiences, the Sheriff probably could protect his own 
legitimate concerns by some means less restrictive than a 
flat ban on press access. The DC's opinion stated that, 
"The specific methods of implementing such a press 
-
access] policy must be determined by" the Sheriff, subject 
to the requirement that some photography and interviews be 
allowed. This, it could be argued, gives the Sheriff a 
good deal of leeway to develop procedures that will allay 
his fears. Once again, however, I doubt whether the Pell 
majority's rationale will allow it to recognize an 
apparent lack of justification for a complete ban on press 
access, if the public is not given the same access sought 






C. Judge Hufstedler's argument. Judge Hufstedler, 
writing in CA9, argued that Pell and Saxbe did not decide 
the question whether the press could be confined to the 
same limitations on access as are applied to the general 
public. This is so because in both cases the press in 
fact had greater access than the public. Moreover, Pell's 
statement that the press has no greater right of access 
than the public does not tell "what the public's right is 
or how the right is to be vindicated." Pet.App. at 23. 
Thus, the questions presented by this case became: 
(1) What kind of information about prisons and 
prisoners does the public have a right to know? 
Or, to put the question differently, from what 
kind of information about prisons and prisoners 
should the public be excluded? (2) What kinds of 
limitations can be imposed on the public and on 
the news media upon the means by which the 
information to which the public is entitled can 
be gathered? 
The answer to the first question is that the public is 
entitled to information about prisons and prisoners 
"except to the extent [that limitations are] reasonably 
necessary to shield the prisoners' small store of personal 
privacy, to protect the physical security of the prison, 
the prisoners, and prison personnel, and to allow prison 
personnel enough privacy and administrative control to 
permit them effectively to perform their duties." Id. at 
24. The answer to the second question is that, although 
the press and the public are entitled to the same 
information about prisons, they are not necessarily 










information. Both a group tour by members of the general 
public and a single newsman's visit are ways for the 
public to obtain the information to which it is entitled. 
But, while there may be good reasons to limit the scope of 
the group tour, those reasons do not necessarily apply to 
the single newman's visit. 
In this case, the access granted to the press is 
designed simply to facilitate obtaining of the information 
to which the press and the public are equally entitled. 
Therefore, although the access granted to the press here 
is not "equal" to that granted to the public in a physical 
sense, neither is it inconsistent with the teaching of 
Pell and Saxbe. 
Discussion. Judge Hufstedler's argument is 
useful because it points up the fact that there may be two 
separate questions involved in this, and in many, press 
access cases: first, the question of physical access to a 
place; and second, the question of access to particular 
information. If all or most of the general public is 
excluded from a place simply because all interested 
members of the general public could not be accomodated, 
then there is a good argument that the press should be 
allowed special access. For example, the Courtroom cannot 
accomodate all interested members of the general public 
when a case like Bakke is argued. But, because all 
interested members of the general public in some sense are 





Court sets aside seats for members of the press so they 
can report to the public. The public is not entitled to 
know what transpires at Conference, however, so neither 
the press nor the general public is admitted to that. 
16. 
It could be argued that in general a prison is 
like a courtroom that cannot hold everyone who wants to 
get in, and not like a Conference where no one has a right 
to get in. Pell and Saxbe could be explained as special 
cases where interviews with particular inmates ~ere like 
Conference: no one has a right to that information. But, 
as Judge Hufstedler seems to argue, this case could be 
treated as one where the proceedings are public, but where 
there just are not enough seats for all interested members 
of the general public, so that the press should have a 
special right to some of the seats. 
This approach leaves the knotty problem of 
deciding what information the public is entitled to. I do 
not think this should cause problems in most prison cases, 
because most of what transpires in prisons must become 
public record in one way or another anyway. Santa Rita 
jail, for example, probably was required by law to 
announce that a suicide had occurred there, and it likely 
had to report to the federal court on efforts to upgrade 
conditions. Thus, the information that respondents here 
sought to report already was "public" in some significant 
sense. Cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 





Court to decide whether the First Amendment functions 
anything like a Freedom of Information Act. 
17. 
D. If the majority votes to reverse. If none of 
these ways of distinguishing Pell and Saxbe convinces a 
majority, I would strongly urge that you adhere to your 
position in those cases. I think it is correct, and I 
think it is important for you to continue to a r ticulate it 
for the benefit of future Justices and, with luck, future 
majorities. One day they may need persuasive authority 
for adopting your position. 
J.A. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
~ No. 70-1310 
Thomas L. Houchins, Sheriff of 
the County of Alameda, 
California, Petitioner, 
On Writ of Certiorari to the '(_ w ~ 
United States Court of 3 // ¥ 
Appeals for the Ninth / ' 
v. j Circuit. 
KQED, Inc., et al. ~ • • 
[March -, 1978] ~
MR. JusTICE STEVENS, delivered the opinion of the Court. -  
The question presented is whether a preliminary injunction ~~ J 
requiring the Sheriff of Alameda County, Cal., to allow 
representatives of the news media access to the county jail is ""'f 
consistent with the holding in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, ~ ,:;f- • 
834, that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to ~ ~ 
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general G ,,.i __J~ 
public." ~"'7 • 
Respondent KQED, Inc., operates a public service television 
station . in Oakland, Cal. It has televised a number of pro-~ • -I-
grams about prison conditions and prison inmates. KQED ~ 
reporters have been granted access to various correctional 
fa,ei}ities in the San Francisco Bay ,area, including San Quentin -/-M., 
State Prison, Soledad Prison anq the San Francisco County ~ 
Jails at San Bruno and San Francisco, to prepare program J ~"' .• A I j ~ . ~ .6 
material They have taken their ca.mer~ and recording equip-/J,-~~ 
ment inside the walls of those institutions and interviewed ~ 
inmates. No disturbances or other problems have occurred on IJlA.. fl I tJ • 
those occasions. 
KQED has also reported newsworthy events involving the (J.. • 4 I 
Alamed& County Jail in Santa Rita, including a 1972 newscast / ~ / 
111 
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-
that the "shocking and debasing conditions which prevailed 
[at Santa Rita] constituted cruel and unusual punishment for 
man or bei:ist as a matter of law." 1 Petitioner is the Sheriff 
of Alameda County and has general supervision and control of 
the Santa Rita facility. 2 
On March 31 , 1975, KQED reported the suicide of a prisoner 
in the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita jail. That program 
also carried a statement by a psychiatrist assigned to Santa 
Rita to the effect that conditions in the Greystone facility were 
responsible for illnesses of inmates.3 Petitioner's disagree-
ment with that conclusion was reported on the same newscast. 
KQED reqµested permission to visit and photograph the 
.area of the jail where the suicide occurred. Petitioner refused, 
advising KQED that it was his polic not to ermit an acce s 
to the jail b4 the news media. · is policy was also invoked 
by petitioner to deny su2tsequent requests for access to thejail 
in order to cover news stories about conditions and alleged 
· inciqents within the facility.4 Except for a carefully super- , 
vised tour in 1972, the news media were completely excluded 
from the inner portions of the Santa Rita jail until after this 
action was commenced." 
Respondents KQED, and the Alameda and Oakland branches 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
1 See Brenneman v. Madison, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972) . 
Based on a personal visit to the faci lit.y, .Judge Zirpoli rea,ched the 
"inescapable conclusion that Greystone should be razed to the ground." 
2 Petitioner has been employed by the Sheriff's Department for 30 
years, including five as commanding officer of the jail at Santa. Rita. He 
was elected to his present office in 197 4. 
3 The psychiatrist was discharged after the t,e]ecast. 
4 Access was denied, for example, to cover stories of alleged gang rapes 
and poor physical conditions within the jail, Tr. 208, and of recent escapes 
from the jail, Tr. 135-136. 
5 A previous sheriff had conducted one "press tour" in 1972, attended 
by reporters and cameramen. But the faci lit.y had been "freshly scrubbed" 
for the tour and the reporters were forbidden, to ask any questions of the 
i.n:mRtefi. the)! encol)ptei:ed. (AI?I?· 16:--17.) ., 
-
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3 
People,° filed their complaint for equitable relief on June 17, 
1975. 1 The complaint alleged that petitioner had provided no 
"means by which the public may be informed of conditions 
prev~iling in Greystone or by which prisoners' grievances may 
reach the public." It further alleged that petitioner's policy 
of "denying KQED and the public" access to the ja.il facility 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti-
t,ution an'd requested the court to enjoin petitioner "from 
excluding KQED news personnel from the Greystone cells and 
Santa Rita facilities and generally preventing full and accurate 
news coverage of the conditions prevailing therein." App. 6-7. 
With the complaint, respondents filed a motion for a prelim-
fa13,ry injunction, supported by affidavits of representatives of 
the news m~ia, the Sheriff of San Francisco County, and the 
attorney for respondents. The affidavits of the news media 
representatives and the sheriff described the news coverage in 
other penal institutions and uniformly expressed the opinion 
that such coverage had no harmful consequences and in fact 
served a significant public purpose.7 
-0 The NAACP alleged a "special concern with conditions at Santa Rita 
because tlre prisoner population at the jail is disproportionately black, and 
the members of the NAACP depend on the news media for information 
about conditions in the jitil so that they can meaningfully participate in 
the current public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County." Com-
plaint Paragraph 3. 
Since no special relief was requested by or granted to the NAACP, the 
part,ies have focused on the claim of KQED. 
7 The sheriff has a. master's degree in criminology from the University 
of California at Berkeley and 10 year~ experience in law enforcement 
with the San Francisco Police Department,. As sheriff he has general 
supervision and control over the jail facilities in San Francisco. He 
expressed the "opinion, based on, m~' education and experience in law 
enforcement and jail administration, that such programs made an impor-
tant cpntribution to public understanding of jails and jail conditions. In 
my opinion jails are public institutions nnd the public has a right to know 
what i's being done with their tax dollars being spent on jail facilities an,d 
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The affidavit of the attorney for KQED described a series of 
telephone conversations with counsel for the County between 
May 12, 1975 and June 17, when this suit was filed. In the 
'first conversation, respondents' counsel explained KQED's 
problem regarding access to the S11,nta Rita facility. In the 
second, County Counsel stated that a rule or regulation regard-
ing press access would be forthcoming within a week. In the 
third conversation, more than two weeks later, County Counsel 
stated tha.t no access rule had yet been developed, and agreed 
'to forward ·a copy of the prison rules which were then in effect 
for maximuJU security inmates.8 In the last communication, 
on June 10, 1975, County Counsel stated that petitioner was 
contempl11,ting monthly public tours for 25 persons, with the 
first tour tentatively scheduled for July 14. The tours, how-
ever, would not include the cell portions of Greystone and 
would not allow any use of cameras or communication with 
inmates. Respondents filed suit on June 17, 1975. 
In a letter to the County Board of Supervisors dated June 19, 
1975, petitioner outlined a pilot public tour program along the 
lines of that described to respondents' counsel. The Board 
approved six tours. Petitioner then filed his answer and sup-
porting affidavit explaining why he had refused KQED access 
to the jail and identifying the recent changes in policy regard-
ing access to the jail and communication between inmates and 
persons on the outside. Petitioner stated that if KQED's 
request had been granted, he would have felt obligated to 
honor similar requests from other representatives of the press 
and this could have disrupted mealtimes, exercise times, visit-
ing times, and court appearances of inmates.9 He pointed out 
8 The inmates at Santa Rita include ~ det.a~ detainees as well as prisoners 
who have been convicted and :,;entenee . he mles in effect on June 3, 
1975, contained no rule on pre::;;, acee:,;~ . Vi:,;iting was limited to three 
hours on Sunday. All outgoing mail , except letters to judges or lawyers, 
was inspected. The mle prohibited any mention of "the names or a.ctions 
··of any officers" of the jail. 
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that the mail regulations had recently been amended to delete 
a prohibitioii again~t mentioning the names or actions of any 
correctional officers. Petitioner also stated that KQED had 
been advised about the contemplated program of guided tours 
before the suit was filed and that the tours had since been 
approved and publicly announced. With respect to the scope 
of the proposed tours, petitioner explained that the use of 
cameras would be prohibited because it would not be possible 
to prevent 25 persons with cameras from photographing 
inmjl,teS and security operations. Moreover, communication 
with inmates would not be permitted because of excessive time 
consumption, "problems with control" of inmates and visitors, 
and a belief "that interviews would be excessively unwieldy." 10 
An e_yidentiary hearing on _!_he motion for a preliminary 
in.j unction wa~ d after the '1irst ! our gmded tours had taken 
place. The evidence revealed the inadequacy of the tours as a 
means of obtaining information about the inmates and their 
conditions of confinement for transmission to the public. The 
tours failed to enter certain areas of the · ail.11 They afforded 
no opportunity to photograph con 1tions within the facility, 
and the photographs which the County offered for sale to tour 
visitors omitted certain jail characteristics, such as catwalks 
above the cells from which guards can observe the inmates.12 
The tours provided no opportunity to g_uestion randomly 
encountered inmates abouCjail conditions. Indeed, to the 
Information Officer at San Quentin testified that after the liberalization of 
,access rules at that, institution media requests to enter the facility actually 
declined. Tr. 152. This testimony may suggest that the mere existence 
of inflexible access barriers generates a concern that conditions within the 
closed institution require especially close scrutiny. 
10 App., at 24. 
11 The tour did not, include Little Greystone, which was the subject of 
reports of beatings, rapes and poor conditions, or the disciplinary cells. 
12 There were also no photos of the women's cells, of the "safety cell," 
of the "disciplinary cells," or of the interior of Little Greystone. In addi-
tion, the photograph of the dayroom omits the television monitor that 
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extent possible inmates were kept out of sight during the tour, 
preventing the tour visitors from obtaining a realistic pictme 
of the conditions of confinement within the jail. In addition, 
the fixed scheduliitg of the tours prevented coverage of news-
worthy events at the jail. 
Of most importance, all of the remaining tours were com-
pletely bo_Qked and there was no assurance "that any tour would 
be -conducted after75ecember of 1975. The 'tSistrict Court 
found that KQED had no access to the· jail and that the broad 
restraints on access were not required by legitimate penological 
in terests.13 
13 "Sheriff Houchins admitted that because Santa. Rita has never e.xperi-
mented with a more liberal pres;; policy than that presently · in exist.en.ce, 
there is no record of press disturbances. Furthermore, the Sheriff has no 
recollection of hearing of any disruption caused · by the media at other 
penal institutions. Nevertheless Sheriff Houchins stated that he feared 
that, invasion of inmates' privacy, creation of jail 'celebrities,' and threats 
of jail security would result from a more liberal press policy. While such 
fears are not groundless, convincing te8timony was offered that such fears 
can be substantially allayed. 
"As to the inmates' privacy, the media represtmta.tives commonly obtain 
written consent from t.hose inmates who are interviewed and/or photo-
. graphed, and coverage of inmates is never provided without their full 
agreement,. As to pre-trial detainees who could be harmed by pre-trial 
publicity, consent can be obtained not only from such inmates but also 
from their counsel. Jail 'celebrities' are not likely to emerge as a result 
of a random interview policy. Regarding jail security, any cameras and 
equipment brought into the jail can be searched. While Sheriff Houchins 
expressed concern that photographs of electronic locking devices could be 
enlarged and studied in order to facilita.te escape plans, he admitted that 
the inmates themselves can study and · sketch the locking devices. Most 
importantly, there was substantial testimony to the effect that ground 
rules laid down by jail admini;;tra.to1'8, such as a ban on photographs of 
security devices, are consistently respected by the media. 
"Thus, upon reviewing the evidence c.onceni.ing the present media, policy 
at Santa Rita, the Cqurt finds the plaintiffs have demonstrated irr<'parable 
injury, absence of an adequate remedy at law, probability of succesi, op. 
the merits, a favorable public inten>;;t , and a balance of hardships which 
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The District Court thereafter i~ ued a preliminaix injunc-
tion, enjoining petitioner "from denyii1g to KQED news 
~nnel and responsible representatives of the news media 
access to the Santa Rita facilities, including Greystone, at 
reasonable times and hours," or from preventing such repre-
sentatives "from utilizing photographic and sound equipment 
or from utilizing inmate interviews in providing full and 
accurate coverage of the Santa Rita facilities." The court, ! 
however, recognized that petitioner should determine the 
specific means of implementing the order and, in any event, 
should retain the right to deny access when jail tensions or 
other special circumstances require exclusion. 
Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.14 The Court of 
Appeals affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in framing the preliminary injunction under 
review.15 MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, acting as Circuit Justice, 
stayed the mandate and in his opinion on the stay application 
fairly stated the legal issue we subsequently granted certiorari 
to decide: 
"The legal issue to be raised by applicant's petition for 
certiorari seems quite clear. If the 'no greater access' 
doctrine of PeU and Saxbe applies to this case, the Court 
of Appeals and the District Court were wrong, and the 
injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other 
hand, the holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly 
limited to the situation where there already existed sub-
stantial press and public access to the prison, then Pell 
and Saxbe are not necessarily dispositive, and review by 
this Court of the propriety of the injunction, in light of 
'14 Two circuit judges -granted a sta.y of the District Court's order pend~ 
ing disposition of petitioner's appeal. 
15 546 F. 2d 284 (1976). A petition for rehearing, a suggestion for 
rehearing en bane, and a motion to stay the mandate were all denied by 
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those cases, would be appropriate, although not neces-
sary." 429 U.S. 1341, 1344. 
For two reasons, which shall be discussed separately, the 
decisions in P~ U and Sa..-rbe,.do not contraj the propriety of the 
District Court's preliminary injunction. :Wt , the unconsti-
tutionality of petitioner's policies which gave rise to this 
litigation does not rest on the premise that the press has a 
greater right of access to information regarding prison condi-
tions than do other members of the public. Second, relief 
tailored to the needs of the press may properly be awarded to 
a representative of the press which is successful in proving that 
it has been harmed by a constitutional violation and need not 
await the grant of relief to members of the general public who 
may also have been injured by petitioner's unconstitutional 
·access policy but h1we not yet sought to vindicate their rights, 
I 
This litigation grew out of petitioner's refusal to allow 
representatives of the press access to the inner portions of the 
Santa Rita facility. Following those refusals and the institu-
tion of this suit, certain remedial action was taken by peti-
tioner. The mail censorship was relaxed and an experimental 
tour program was initiated. As a preliminary matter, there-
fore we must consider the relevance of the actions after 
March 31, 1975, to the question whether a constitutional vio-
lation had occurred. 
I 
It is well settled that a defendant's corrective action in 
anticipation of litigation or following commencement of suit 
does not deprive the court of power to decide whether the 
previous course of conduct was unlawful. See UniJted States 
v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 and cases cited, at 632-633.16 
16 Moreover, along with the power to decide the merits, the Court's 
pown to grant injunctive relief survives the discontinuruice of illegal con-
duct. "It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injuno. 
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"9 
The propriety of the court's exercise of that power in this case 
is apparent. When this ~t was,_filed, there were no publi_c 
tours. Petitioner enforced a policy of virtually total exclusion 
art'oth the public and the press from those areas within the 
Santa Rita jail where the inmates were confined. At that time 
petitioner also enforced a policy of reading all inmate corre-
spondence addressed to persons other than la'Yyers and judges 
and censoring those portions that related to the conduct of the 
guards who controlled their daily existence. Prison policy as 
well as prison w&,].ls significantly abridged the opportunities for 
communication of information about the conditions of confine-
ment in the Santa Rit~ facility to the public.u Therefore, 
abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit-, and there is a, probability of 
resumption." United States v. Oregon Medical, Society, 343 U. S. 326, 
333. When the District Court, issued the preliminary injunction, there was 
no assurance that the experiment.al public tours would continue beyond 
the next month. Thus, it would certainly have been reasonable for the 
court to assume that, absent injun,ctive relief, the access to the inner por-
tions of the Santa Rita facility would soon be reduced to its prelitigation 
level. 
'17 Thus, when this suit was filed, there exis:too no opportunity for out-
siders to observe the living conditions of the inmates at Santa Rita. And 
the mail regulations prohibited statemPnts about the character of the 
treatment of prisoners by correctional officers. 
We cannot agree with petitioner that the i,i1ma.tes' visitation and tele-
phone privileges were reasonable lllternativc means of informing the pub-
lic at large about conditions within Santa Rita. Neither offered an oppor-
tunity to observe those conditions. Even if a member of the general pub-
lic or a representative of the press were fortunate enough to obtain the 
name of an inmate to visit, access to the facility would not have included 
the inmate's place of confinement. The jajl regulations do not indicate 
that an inmate in the minimum security portion of the jail may enlist 
the aid of Social Service Officers to telephone the press or members of th6 
general public to complain of the conditions of confinement. App. 38 . 
Even if a maximum security inmate may make collect telephone calls, it 
is unlikely that a member of the general public or representa.tive of the 
press would accept the charges, especiaJly without prior knowledge of the 
·call's communicative purpose. 
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even if there would not have been any constitutional violation 
had the access policies adopted by petitioner following com-
mencement of this litigation been in effect all along, it was 
appropriate for the District Court to decide whether the 
restrictive rules in effect when KQED first requested access 
were constitutional. 
In Pell v. Procunie:r, 417 U. S. 817, 834, the Court stated • that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons 
or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." 
But the Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory 
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press from 
access to information about prison conditions would avoid 
constitutional scrutiny.1 8 Indeed, Pell itself strongly suggests 
the contrary. 
cumstances, pretrial detainees may, according to petitioner, be interviewed 
with the consents of the inmates, defense comi,.sel and prosecutor and with 
an order from the court. Not only would such an interview take place 
outside the confines of the jail, but the requirement of a court order makes 
this a patently inadequate means of keeping the public informed about the 
ja.il and its inmatffi. 
Finally, petitioner suggests his willingness to provide the press with 
information regarding the release of prisoners which, according to peti-
tioner, would permit interviews of former prisoners regarding the condi-
tions of their recent confinement. This informll,l offer Wll-8 apparently only 
made in response to respondents' lawsuit. Moreover, it too fails to afford 
the public any opportunity to observe the conditions of confinement. 
Hence, the means available at the time this · suit was instituted for 
informing the general public a.bout conditions in the Santa Rita jail were, 
as a practical matter, nonexistent. 
18 In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17, the Court said: 
"The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unrestrained 
right to gather information." (Emphasis added.) 
And in Bran;burg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,681: 
"We do not question the significance of free speech, press, or assembly 
to the country's welfare. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not 
qualify for First Amendment protection ; without some protection for seek-
ing out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated." 
Both fitatements imply that there is a right to acquire knowledge tha,t 
-
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In that case, representatives of the press claimed the right to 
interview specifically designated inmates. In evaluating this 
claim, the Coqrt di'd not simply inquire whether prison officials 
allowed me.qibers of the general public to coµduct such inter-
views. Rather, it canvassed the opportunities already a.vail-
able for both the public and the press to acquire information 
r~garding the prison a.nd its inmates. And the Court found 
that the policy of prohibiting interviews with inmates specif-
ically designated by the press was "not pjtrt of a.n attempt by 
the state to conceal the conditions in its prisons." The chal-
lenged restriction on access, which was imposed only after 
experience revealed that such interviews posed disciplinary 
problems, was an isolated limitation on the efforts of the press 
to gather information a.bout thpse conditions. It was against I 7' ..a.-LJL_ 
the background of & record which demonstrated that both the 
press and the general public )Vere "accorded full opportunities 
to observe prison conditions," 19 that the Court considered the 
constitutionality · of the single restr11,int on access challenged 
in Pell. 
The decision in Pell, therefore, does not imply that a state 
policy of conce11,ling prison coµditions from the press, or a 
policy denying the press any opportunity to observe those 
conditions, colJ,ld have been justified simply by pointing to like 
derives protection from the First Amendment. See Branzburg, supra, at 
728 n. 4, STEWART, J ., dissenting. 
111 "The Department of Corrections regularly conducts public tours 
through the prisons for the bene6t of interestaj citizens. In addition, 
newsmen are permitted to visit both the ma.ximqm security and minimum 
security sections of the institutions and to stop and speak about any sub-
ject to any inmates whom they might encounter. If security considera-
tions permit, corrections personnel will step aside to permit such interviews 
to be confidential. Apart from general access to all parts of the institu-
tions, newsmef\ are also pel'IQit~d to enter the pri.sons to interview inmates 
selected at random by the corrections officials. By the same token, if a 
newsman wishes to write a story on a partjculttr prison program, he is 
permitted to sit in on group meetings and to interview the inmate pa.r .. 
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concealment from, and denial to, the general public. If that 
were not true, there would have been no need to emphasize 
the substantial press and public access reflected in the record _ 
of that case.20 What Pell does indicate is that the question 
whether respondents established a probability of prevailing on 
their constitutional claim is inseparable from the question 
whether petitioner's policies unduly restricted the oppor-
tunities of the general public to learn about the conditions of 
confinement in Santa Rita jail. As in Pell, in assessing its ~ 
adequacy, the total access of the public and the press must 
be considered. 
Here, the broad restraints on access to information regarding 
opm'""tion of the jail that prevailed on the date this suit was 
instituted are plainly disclose<l by the record. The public and 
the press had consistently been denied any access to those 
' ~ ~ _J ----
~ - -......... 
20 Nor would it have been necessary to note, as the Pell opinion did, the 
fact that the First Amendment protects the free flow of information to 
the public: 
"The constitutional guarantee of a. free press 'assures the maintenance 
of our political system and an open society,' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S. 
374, 389 (1967) , and secures 'the parawount. public interest in a free flow 
of information to the people concerning public officials,' Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964). See also New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U. S. 254 (1964). By the same token, '[a.]ny system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to this Court bea.ring a heavy presumption 
against. its constitutional validity.' New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U. S. 713, 714 (1971); Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 40? 
U.S. 415 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); 
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Correlatively, 
the First and J<'ourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public 
to receive such 'information and ideas as are published. Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U. S., at 762-763; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 
(1969). 
" In Bra:nzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court went further 
and acknowledged that 'news gathering is not without its First Amend-
·ment protections,' id., at 707, for 'without some protection for seeking out 
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,' id., at .681." 417 
U.S., at 832--8:33. 
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portions of the Santa Rita facility where inmates were confined 
and there had been excessive censorship of inmate corre-
spondence. Petitioner's no-access policy, modified only in the 
wake of respondents' resort to the courts, could survive consti-
tutional scrutiny only if the Con~titution affords no protection 
to the public's right to be informed about conditions within 
those public institutions where some of its members are con-
fi~ed becatJ.se they have bee}) charged with or found guilty of 
criminal offenses. 
II 
The preservation of a full and free flow of information to 
the general public has long been recognized as a core objective 
of the First Amendment to the Constitution.21 It is for this 
reason that the First Amendment protects not only the dis-
semination but also the receipt of information and ideas. See, 
e. g., Virginia PharllJP,CY Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 756rProcunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-
409; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-763.22 Thus, 
in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, the Court invalidated prison 
regulations authorizing excessive c~nsorship of outgoing inmate 
correspondence because such censorship abridged the rights of 
the intended recipients. See also Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F. 
2d 1335, 1346, n. 8 (CA7 1973) . So here, petitioner's preliti-
gation prohibition on mentioning the conduct of jail officers in 
outgoing correspondence must be considered an impingement 
21 See, e. g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 764-765; Garrison v. Louisiana, 370 U.S. 64, 77; New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U. S. 254, 266---270; Associated Press v. United 
States, 326 U.S. 1, 20; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250. 
I See also Branzburg v. HayeB, 408 U. S. 665, 726 n. 2 (S'I'EWAR'l', J., dissenting.) 
,z-i See also Larrumt v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S. 301; Red Lion 
Broadcastinn Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 300; Stanley v. Georgia, 304 U.S. 
557, 564; Martin v. City of Struthers, 31~ U.S. 141 ; Marsh v. Alabama.., 
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on the noninmate correspondent's interest in receiving the 
intended communication. 
~ ~dition to safeguarding the right of one inclividual to 
receive what another elects to communicate, the First Amend-
ment serves an essential societal function.23 Our system of 
self-government assumes the existence of an informed citi-
zenry.24 As Madison wrote: 
"A popular Government, without popular information 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or 
a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever gov-
ern ignorance. And 11, people who mea,n to be their own 
governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge 
gives." Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hurst ed. 
1910). 
I~ not sufficientJ therefore, that the channels of communica-
tioI_! J2e free of governmental restraint~ Without some pro-
23 "What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amend-
ment in preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs. No 
aspect of that const.itutionaJ guarantee is more treasured than its protec-
tion of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider 
anq resolve their o-.yn destiny. . . . It embodies our Nation's commit.. 
ment to popular se!f-determiMtion and our abiding faith that the surest 
course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views 
as public issues. 1\.nd public debate must not only be unfettered; it must 
also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated tha.t 
First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas 
as well as the right of free expression·." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 
417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (PowELL, J., dissentmi}. 
24 See A. Meiklejohn, F'ree Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 
26 (1948): 
"Just as far as ... the citizen;, who are to decide an issue are denied 
. acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criti-
' cism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-
considered, ill~baJanced planning, for the general good. It is that mutila• 
tion of the thinking process of the commimity agall1$t which the First 
Amendment to the Constitution is directea. 
~ 
( 
- - ~~~ 
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tection for the acquisition of information about the o eration 
of pu ic insti u ions such as prisons y t e pu 1c at arge, the 
process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would 
be stripped of its substance.25 
1~· 
For that reason information-g.!!_thering is entitled to some 
measure of constitutional protea1on. S'ee, e. g., Branz"burg v. 
Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 681; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 833; 
"a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist." 26 
As this Court's decisions clearly indicate, however, this protec-
tion is not for the private benefit of those who might qualify 
as representatives of the "press" but to insure that the citizens 
are fully informed regarding matters of public interest and 
importance. 
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, represent-
atives of the "press" challenged a state tax on the advertising 
revenues of newspapers. In the Court's words, the issue raised 
by the tax went "to the heart of the natural right of the 
members of an organized society, united for their common 
good, to impart and acquire information about their common 
interests." Id., at 243. The opinion described the long struggle 
.J 
25 Admitt.edly, the right to receive or a.cquire information is not specifi-
cally mentioned in the Constitution. But. "the protection of the Bill of 
Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from ... abridge-
ment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the 
express guarantees fully meaningful. . . . The dissemination of ideas can 
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing adherents are ,not free to receive 
and con:;ider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had 
only sellers and no buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S., at 
380 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). It would be an even more barren market7 
place that had willing buyers and seller:; and no meaningful information 
to exchange. ___, 
26 See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 727 (STEWART, J ., dissenting): 
"No les8 important to the news dis:;emination process is the gathering of 
information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for 
without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be 
impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a right to gather news, of 
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.in England against the stamp tax and tax on advertisements-
the so-called "taxes on knowledge": 
"[I]n the adoption of the ... [taxes] the dominant and 
controlling aim was to prevent. or curtail the opportunity 
for, the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect 
of their governmental -affairs. . . . The aim of the strug-
gle {against those ta.xes] was ... to establish and pre-
serve the right of the English people to full information in 
respect of the doings or misdoings of their government. 
Upon the correctness of this conclusion, the very charac-
terizations of the exactions as 'taxes on knowledge' sheds 
a flood of corroborative light. In the ultimate, an in-
formed and enlightened public opinion was the thing at 
stake." Id., at 247. 
Noting the familiarity of the Framers with this struggle, 
the Court held: 
"[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of 
all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or 
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press 
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. 
The tax involved here is bad ... because. in light of its 
history and its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate 
a,nd c;tlculated device ... to limit the circulation of 
information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the 
constitutional guaranties." Id., at 250. 
A recognition that the "underlying right is the right of 
public generally" 27 is also implicit in the doctrine that "news-
men have no ""constitutional right of access to prisons or their 
·inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U. S., at 834. In P~ll i1 was unnecessary to ---... 
consider the extent of the public's right of access to .m.forma-
tion regarding the prison and its inmates in order to adjudicate 
- ......... 
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the press claim to a particular form of access, since the record 
dernonstr11ted that the flow of information to the public, both 
directly and th-rough the press, was adequate to survive consti-
tutional challenge; institutional considerations justified deny-
ing the single, additional mode of access sought by the press in 
that case: 
- Here, in contrast, the restrictions on access to the inner 
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this 
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the 
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is '--
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of informa-
tion at its source, abridged the public's right to be informed 
about those conditions. 
The ariswer to that question does not depend upon the 
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of 
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions 
1 of policy which generally must be resolved by the political 
branches of government. Moreover, there are unquestionably 
---occasiohs when governmental activity may properly be carried 
on in complete secrecy. For example, the public and the press 
are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our ow 
conferences, [and] the meetings of other official bodies ga r-
ing in executive sessioq ._ ." Branzburg v: Ha s, 408 
U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 834. In such 
situations the reasons for withholding i)1formation rom the 
public are both apparent and legitimate.28 
28 In the case of grand jury proceeding:;, for example, the secrecy rule 
has been justified on several grounds: 
"(l) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contem-
pla.ted; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its delibera-
tions, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from 
importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or· 
tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later 
appear at the trial of those indicted by it; ( 4) to encourage free and· 
untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information with respect to 
tlie CQll\ltllilSion of crime$; (5) to protect innocent accused who is exoner-· 
1t.e. {ist {.A.)e~t- C>lA ·le- rv-.clude ''fi..e I.Mee{;~ 
-----) 0 i r V; Ja.fe ()'{v {J" I zo ✓, ·t-4) t i/f1-J2- SC[),{ ~P17 
o v-- d ; s;a 5:1-ex e,.,,)l-a.,.J µ ~.12°J e._ V, 1,1..-.e_ 
~/;e, , s ex: e.Jo/):JJ, '' l/-6'? US.1 J-(/?lf-~-;: 
- -
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l rvt In this case, however, "[r]espondents do not assert a right ~ tf .-4 
to force disclosure of confidential information or to invade in I l ,,,_~:tS u -/ 
any way the decisionmlll{ing processes of governmental offi- J l r, .,,., 
cials."." They simply seek an end to petitioner's policy of c,R vJi.,,!(' 
concealing prison conditions from the public. J'hose condi- / 
tions are wholly without claim to confideqtiality. While prison 
· officials have aninterest in the time and manner of public 
. acquisition of information about the institutions they admin-
ister, no one eve~ suggests that there is any legitimate, 
penological justification for concealing from citizens the condi-
ti9ns in which their fellow citizens are being confined.30 
The reasons which militate • favor of providing special 
protection to the flow of information to the pµblic about 
prisons relate to the unique function they perform in a demo-
cratic society. Not only are they public institutions, financed 
with public funds and administered by public servants; 31 
they are an integral component of the criminal justice system. 
The citizens confined therein are temporarily, and sometimes 
permanently, deprived of their liberty as a result of a trial 
which must conform to the dictates of the Constitution. By 
ated from disclosure of the fact that. he has been under investigation, and 
from t.he expense of standing trial where there •Was no probability of 
guilt.." United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U. S.-677, 681 n. 6. 
29 &u:be v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S., at 861 (POWELL, J., 
dissenting). - • 
30 The Court. in Saxbe noted that " 'prisons are institutions where pub-
lic access is generally limited.'" 417 U. S., at 849 (citation omitted). 
This truism reflects the fact that there are legitimate penological inter-
' ests served by regulating access, e. g., security and confinement. But con-
cealing prison conditions from the public is not one of those legitimate 
objectives. 
31 "The administration of these institutions, the effectiveness of their 
rehabilitative programs, the conditions of con,finement. that. they maintain, 
and t.he experiences of the individuals incarcerated therein are all matters 
of legitima.te societal interest and concern.'' Baxbe v. Washington Post Co., 
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expr~s command of the Sixth Amendment the proceeding 
mqst be a '!public trial." 32 It is important not only that the 
tritil itself be fair, but also that the community at large have 
co11Qdence in ~he integrity of the proceeqing.33 That public 
interest survives the judgment of conviction and appropriately 
carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is 
treawd during his period of punishwent and hoped-for rehabil-
itation. While a . ward of the State and subject to its sterp 
d~sciplii1e, he retains constitutional protections against cruel 
~d'qnusual punish'went, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 
97; a protect~on which may derive more :practical support from 
l:\,Ccess to information about prisons by the public than by 
'. ' 
occasionaJ litigation in a, busy court.34 . 
, Some inµiates-in 811,nta Rita, a ~ubstt\ntip.l nUTPher-are 
pretrial q~t~ ees. Though confined pending tri11l, they have 
not bee~1 convicted of an offense against society and are 
e'ntitled to the presumption of innocence. Certain peno1ogical 
objectives, i. e., punishment, deterrence and rehabilitat.ion, 
which are legiti~ate in regard to convicted prisoners, are inap-
32 In all criminal prosecutions, the acctised shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and pµb~c trial, by an impartial jury of the State and dist rict 
wherein the orµne shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascerta~ned by la.w, a11d to be informed of thfl nature a,nd 
cause of the accus11,tions; ... " U.S. Const., Amend. VI. , 
83 "The right to a public trial is not only to protect tbe accused but, to . 
protect as much the public's right to kn,ow what goes on when men's lives 
and liberty are at stake .... " Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F. 2d 791, 792 (CA4 
1965). See also In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 270: "The knowledge that 
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of 
public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power." 
114 In fact, conditions within the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita. 
facility had been found to constitute cruel and unusual punishment. 
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972) . The 
public's interest in eni,uring that these conditions ha.ve been remedied jg 
app{U'ent. For, in fina.l analysis, it is the citizens who bear re6ponsibi1ity-
toi: tlJ~ ~t:IJ.lent'l!!CCQJ'q,~ t.l1Q$e confin~ within penal institutions, 
I 
·· - !; 
·~ 
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plicable to pretrial detainees."5 Society has a special interest 
in ensuring that unconvicted citizens are treated in accord with 
"tpeir status. . (J 
In this case, the record demonstrates that both the public 
·and the press had been consistently c;lfyl~d any access to the 
inner portions of the Santa Rita jair,-that ~re had been 
·excessive censorship of inma.te correspondence~d that there 
was no valid justification for these broad restraints on the flow 
·of information. An affirmative answer to the question whether 
respondent established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits 
did n~t depend, in final analysis, on any right of the press to 
special treatment beyond that accorded the. public at large. 
Ratqer, the probable existence of a constitutional violation 
rested upon the special importance of allowing a democratic 
community access to knowledge about how its servants were 
treitting some of its members who have been committed to 
their custody. An official prison policy of concealing such 
knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting ofI the flow of 
information a,t its source abridges the freedom of speech and 
of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution.36 
35 "Incarceration after conviction is imposed to ptmish, to deter, and to 
- rehabilitate the convict. . . . Some freedom to accomplish these ends must 
of necessity be afforded prison personnel. Conversely, where incarceration 
is imposed prior to conviction, deterrence, punishment, and retribution 
are not legitimate functions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is 
but a temporary holding operation, and their necessary freedom of action 
is concomitantly diminished. . . . Punitive measures in such a context are 
out of harmony with the presumption of in,nocence." Anderson v. Nosser, 
438 F . 2d 18.1, 190 (CA51971) . 
36 When fundamental freedoms of citizen.-; have been at stake, the Court 
has recognized that an abridgement of those freedoms may follow from a 
wide variety of governmental policies, See, e. g., American Communica-
tions Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 ; NAACP v. 4labama, 357 U.S. 449; 
Boyd v. United States, 116 U. 8. 616 ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 291 
U.S. 233. . 
'), ,1.,.R~J ,-0' ,, 
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The preliminary injunction entered by the District Court 
granted relief to KQED without providing any specific remedy 
for other members of the public. Moreover, it imposed duti_es --
Of\ etitioner that ma not be required b the Con titution I ~ 
itsel . Tfie injunction was not an a use o discretion for 
either of these reas~. -- - • 
lf a l~an prove that he has suffered specific harm 
froJn the application of an unconstitutional policy, it is 
entirely proper for a court to grant relief tailored to his needs 
without attempting to redress all the misch~ef that the policy ) 
may have worked on others. Though the public and the press -<\ 
have an equal right to receive information and ideas, different 
iµetbods of remen;yiug._a yiolation oUhat right n.2.ay_§ometimes 
be needed to accommodate the special concerns of the one or 
the ot~ · Prelimin~ry relief could theref~re appropriately be 
awarded to KQED on the basis of its proof of how it w11s 
affected by the challenged policy without also gr~nting specific 
relief to the general public. Indeed, since our adversary 
system contemplates the adjudication of specific controversies 
between specific litigants, it would have been improper for the 
District Court to attempt to provide a remedy to persons who 
have not requested separate relief. Accordingly, even though 
the Cons itJJ..ti~ provides the press wit~ no greater right of ) 
access to informatfmy than that possesseq by the public at SJ 
large, a pre 1mma.ry injunction is not iri'valid simply because it 
awards special relief to a successful litigant which is a repre-
sentative of the press:37 
37 Moreover, the relief grall,ted to KQED will redound to the benefit of 
members of the public j.nterested in obtaining information about condi-
tions in the Santa ~ita jail. The press may have no greater constitutionaJ 
righl,!o i!!formation ahout)prisons than that possessed by the general pub-
lic. But when the press does acquire il\forma.tion and disseminate it to 
the public, it performs An important societal function. 
" In seeking o~t the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the pub• 
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Nor is there 1:tnything novel about injunctive relief which 
goes beyond a .rpere prohibition against repetition of previous 
unlawfql conduct. In situations which are both numerous and 
varied the chancellor has required a wrongdoer to take affirma- / 
tive steps · to eJiminate the1,,!;,ffec.!,s)>f 9:, violation of la~ _even _ / 
though the law itself impo§g no duty to take the remedial 
action decreed by the court.38 It follow~ that if prison regula-
tions and policies have unconstitution~lly suppressed informa-
tion and ipterfered wit4 communication in violation of the 
First Ameqdment, t~istrict Qourt hfl,S the power to require, 
-;7 a.l,Jt:8.§~J;,e.IJ}JlP[ag,ly, that the channe's of communication be 
opeped more widel)'hthan the law would otherwise require in 
;;-rder to Jet relevant facts, which may have been conce~led, 
corµe to light. Whether or not final relief along the lines of I 
that preliminarily awarded in this Cf\80 would be "aptly tai-
lored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional viola-
tion," Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 287, it is perfectly 
clear that the Court had power to enter an injunction which I 
was broader than a mere prohibition against illegal conduct. 
The Court of Appeals found no reason to question the 
specific preliminary relief ordered by the District Court. Nor 
would i,t be appropriate for us to review the scope of the 
information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government. By erutbl-
ing the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the 
press performs a critical function in effecting the societal purpose of t~e 
First Amendment." Saxbe v. WashingtQn Post Co., 417 U. S., at 863-864 
(POWELL, J., dissenting). --See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 726-727 (STEWART, J., dissenting). 
In the context of fashioning a remedy for' a violation of rights protected:p 
by the First Amendment, consideration of the roll" of the press in our 
society is appropriate. 
38 For an extensive discussion of this practice in the context of desegre-
gation decrees, see. the Co1irt's opinion last Term in Milliken v. Bradley, 
· 433 u. s. 267. 
-
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order.8 9 The order was preliminary in character, and is subject 
to revision in the light of experience and such evidence and 
argument as may be presented before the litigation is finally 
concluded. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
MR. dU?TICE MARSHALL and MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN 
took no part in the consideration or decision of 
this case. 
38 We note, however, that the Di E=trict Court. was presented with sub-
stantial evidence indic,1 ting that the ui,e of cameras and interviPws with 
randomly selected inmat.es neither jeopardized security nor threatened 
legitj~te ~ olo~ical i~terff: ts in . other prisons where such access w~g, 
:perm,1tted.. See Procumer "· Ma.r,t1nez, 416, U.S., at 414 n. 14. 
- -~u:prtmt~ottrlof~t µni:tth~taftg 
'Jlfagfrhtghm. J. ~. 21lgt)!.~ 
CHAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WM . J . BRENNAN, JR. 
March 16, -1978 
RE: No. 76-1310 Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 
Dear John: 
I agree. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
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I agree. 
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To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim Alt 
• 
March 17, 1978 
~ -,• d' ,, ,w 
Re: Justice Stevens' First Draft opinion for the Court in 
No. 76-1310, Houchins v. KQED. 
If Justice Stevens' opinion commands a majority, I think 
that it will become a landmark precedent. The opinion is 
consistent with Pell and Saxbe, because it concedes that the 
the press has "no greater right of access to information than 
that possessed by the public at large." Draft at 21; accord, 
1/ 
id., at 10.- But it breaks new ground in holding that both 
the press and the public have a First Amendment right of access 
to information that is in the government's hands, which can 
be overridden only for good reasons: 
"[T]he Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory 
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press 
from access to information about prison conditions would 
avoid constitutional scrutiny." Id., at 10. 
"Petitioner's no-access policy .•. could survive 
constitutional scrutiny only if the Constitution affords 
no protection to the public's right to be informed about 
conditions within those public institutions where some of 
its members are confined ••• " Id., at 13. 
"It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channel~ of 
connnunication be free of governmental restraints. Without some 
protection for the acquisition of information about the 
operation of public institutions such as prisons by the public 
at large, the process of self-governance contemplated by the 
Framers would be stripped of its substance." Id., at 14-15. 
"The question is whether petitioner's policies, which cut 
off the flow of information at its source, abridged the public's 
right to be informed ••• " Id., at 17. 
"equal" 
1. The Justice does state that the public's and press's/rights 
might be implimentedcfffferently: "Though the public and the press 
have an equal right to receive information and ideas, different 
methods of remedying a violation of that right may Sometimes be 





- • 2. 
I believe that Justice Stevens' opinion meets the concern~, 
and tracks certain of the views, that you expressed in your 
Saxbe dissent. Although the Saxbe majority did not say in so 
many words that neither the press nor the public had any right 
of access to information in the government's hands, you feared 
that that was the implication of the majority holding: "For all L (- P 
that appears in the Court's opinion, one would think that any 
governmental restriction on access to information, no matter how 
severe, would be constitutionally acceptable to the majority so 
long as it does not single out the media for special disabilities 
not applicable to the public at large." Saxbe, 417 U.S., at 857. 
----
You stated that you "cannot follow the Court in concluding that~ 
governmental restriction on press access to information, so 
long as it is nondiscriminatory, falls outside the purview of First 
Amendment concern." Ibid. And you expanded on the thought: 
"It goes too far to suggest that the government must justify 
under the stringent standards of First Amendment review every 
regulation that might affect in some tangential way the 
availability of information to the news media. But to my 
mind it is equally impermissible to conclude that no 
governmental inhibition of press access to newsworthy informa t ion 
warrants constitutional scrutiny. At some point official 
restraints on access to news sources, even though not directed 
solely at the press, may so undermine the function of the First 
Amendment that it is both appropriate and necessary to require 
the government to justify such regulations in terms more 
compelling than discretionary authority and administrative 
convenience." Id., at 860. 
You were willing to strike down the interview ban in Saxbe because 
you could discern no legitimate governmental interest that it served. 
See id., at 861. 
My own view is that the principle announced in Justice Stevens' 
- 3. 
- 2/ opinion is sound.- It is true that the principle will give rise 
y[ 
to difficult questions as to what is a sufficient justification 
for refusing to release information. Justice Stevens hints ------broadly that the Court is not abou.t t a apply a "compelling state 
interest" test in this context; but he leaves unsaid what standard 
----
it will apply: 
~~ 
ifl")--t"1 
"The answer to '[ the] question [in this case] does not 
depend upon the degree of public disclosure which should 
attend the operation of most governmental activity. Such 
matters involve questions of policy which generally must be 
resolved by the political branches of government• Moreover, 
there are unquestionably occasions when governmental 
1 secrecy may properly be carried on in complete secrecy. For 
example, the public and the press are corrnnonly excluded from 
( 'grand jury proceedings, our own conferences, [and] the 
~ 
meetings of other official bodies gathering in executive 
U~.k...) session .••• • [Quoting Branzbur~ v. Hates] In such 
r-- situations the reasons for withhol ing in ormation from 
the public are both apparent and legitimate." Draft at 17. 
- ~ doubt whether these disclaimers will prevent a fair volume of 
{'17 ~ tigation testing the new principle from arising, but they should 
l}f\'~ give courts a signal not to go hog-wild in granting access. Although 
~· a difficult set of questions will have to be resolved, it seems to 
l
~e that, as you and Justice Stevens have argued, the policy of 
the First Amendment requires that the task be undertaken. 
* * ·k * * 
A couple of other points about the opinion should be noted . 
First, Justice Stevens has decided the case on the facts as they 
existed at the time the complaint was filed (when there was virtually 
no access to either the public or the press), rather than at the 
time the DC decided the case (after the Sheriff instituted his so-callee 
- 2. This principle may also be the only way to square the outcome 
here with that in Pell and Saxbe. Cf. Bench Memo at 15-17. 
e • 4. 
- "public tours"). See Draft at 8-10. Although this technique 
is dabatable, it has the virtue of narrowing the decision here 
to cover only a situation where the press and the public have 
virtually no access at all. 
• 
-
Second, the Justice quite carefully avoids deciding whether 
the degree of access ordered by the DC in its preliminary injunction 
goes beyond what the First Amendment requires. See Draft at 21-23. 
Although this, too, is a debatable technique, it too narrows 
somewhat the scope of the decision in this case. 
* ·k ,'( * * 
I expect that Justice Stevens will draw heavy fire from 
the dissenters. Indeed, I would be a little surprised if he 
can get a majority to join his opinion, since other Members of 
the Court may not be eager to announce what may come to be a 
general "right of access to information" under the First Amendment. 
Even if the Jus~tice does get a majority to join his opinion, the 
Court will be in the awkward position of handing down an important 
new precedent by a 4-3 vote. I think that the last time this happened 
was in Fuentes v. Shevin, and the aftermath of that decision has 
not been altogether happy. But since this case must be decided, I 
see no way to avoid the situation. 
JA 
y • .. •. 
5'; • . 
r.,.f, 
:'i-t-·· '·,_; 
',. tr: ~- ,'.--_,:'_ . ... 'r-
" 
·~ 
~ ri . ., .... 









Over the weekend, I read wlth 
admiration your opinion for the Court. 
and 
My interest derives, in major part, from the fact 
that I read your opinion as a substantial adoption of the 
views I expressed in my Saxbe dissent. I admire your 
opinion because, in addition to being extremely well 
written, you come out with sound doctrine and yet 
accomplish this consistently with Saxbe as well as Pell. 
If your draft becomes the opinion of the Court, as 
I hope, it will be a landmark precent. It wilL be the 
first time that the Court has held that both the press and 
the public share a First Amendment right of access ' to 
information in the government•~ hands, subject to 
appropriate safeguards. 
~- ,,µ ' 
I do have a coupJe of suggestions that I think are 
quite important. We know that pressures from various 
sources, in addition to the- press, have .been building in 
recent years for total disclosure of al~ information in the 
hands of government, · however conf identfa'l or .secret .. it may 
be when judged in terms of enabling government tq 
function. For example, there are law professors who join 
the media in saying th~t -conferences of our Court should be 
open to the public. The Freedom of Informatjon Act also 
has caused serious problems. Ed Levi told me that it now 
requires the full time attention of over 100 people in the ' 
Justice Department simply to process demands. This sort of 
"openness" has the merit you identify. It also has 
negatives. It causes people in government to be ever ~ 
fearful that their views and recommendations will end up in 
the public press or in some congressional expose. Thus, 
forthright candor - that often exists only if one is 
assured of confidentiality - is likely to become a 
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disappearing characteristic of government officials and 
.-·1~ employees. 
~-.. 
· In Nixon I (418 U.S . 683, at 705), the Court 
declined to sustain an absolute privilege by the President, 
but ~ecognized the need for a qualified privilege: 
; . 
,• 
"The first ground rof the privilege] is the valid 
need for protection of communications between high 
Govrernment offi c 5als and those who advise and 
assist them in the performance of their manifold 
duties; the importance of this confidentiality is 
too plain to require further discussion. Human 
experience teaches that those who expect public 
dissemination of their remarks may well temper 
candor with a concern for appearances and for 
their own interests to the detriment of the 
decisionmaking process." 
We held that the qualified privilege has "constitutional 
underpinnings" . (Id. 706). If th.e Court now holds, in 
accordance with your draft, that there is a constitutional 
right of access to information in the government's hands, ·1 
suppose courts will be cal~ed upon to "balance" the 
interests supporting the qualified right of governmentaJ 
officials to confide~tialitv and the right of access. The 
difficulty · is that normally a First Amendment !:'ight weighs 
more heavily in the sca 1 es of a haJancing analysis than · 
almost any other right. I therefore suggest the -
desirability of some broader caveat than the sentence on 
page 17 of your draft. There, you recognize the 
confidentiality of "proceefings, conferences and meetings 
of official bodies" (citing ~.E.?n!burg), but this language 
c an be read as not includj ngthe type of confidentiality 
recognized i.n ~i_~on. · 
. In a different context, ;£he effectiveness of our 
foreign intelligence (CIA) and the domestic intelligence 
(FBI) services has been serious l y handicapped by the 
investigations and the "exposes~ with which we .are all 
familiar. An official of the Carter administration 
(indeed, a member of the Cabinet) has told me within the 
past three months that the broad ranging (and often 
publicity seeking) "investigations" of the CIA over the 
past couple of years have ~ubstantfally impaired its 
capacity to serve our country effectively. My source is 
neither the Secretary of Defense nor of State. I would 
think it quite important to provide some specific 
recognition of the need for. secrecy. Somethjng along the 
following lines would do iJ: 
• .. 
- . -.:,:-.' 
"In addition, some functions of government -
essential to the protectjon of the public and 
indeed our country's vital interests - necessarily 
require a large measure of secrecy, subject to 
appropriate legislative ov~!'.'-sight . " 
Even the recognition of the qualified privilege of 
confidentiality of government officials, and the inclusion 
of the foregoing sentence, will not, prevent your opinion 
from encouraging numerous attempts to obtain arguably 
confidential and secret information. In short, we can 
expect a good deal of litigation testing the rea~h of the 
new principle that you articulate so well. But additions 
along the lines I have suggested should give courts a strong 
signal not to view the opinion as justifying intrusions on 
confidentiality and secrecy where these are necessary to 
the proper functioning of government. · 
In sum, I am enthusiastic about your op1n1on; 
I do think it would be wise to make somewhat cleare4 
the right of access.-~ necess;:lrily has ·- limitations. 
I •' am not circulating th'is ·:1etter, to ttie 
Conference, as I am hopeful you 'can make _; changes 
enable .me to join you promP,t ly. · · · 
-
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
-
~u:puuu <!}mtrl o-f ~ ~f.tb- ~fatt,g 
'Jl'rudfinghttt. !}. <!}. 2lJffe'J,, 
March 21, 1978 
Re: 76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED 
Dear Lewis: 
Needless to say I am most gratified by your 
letter, and I think your concern is entirely 
justified. Do you think the suggested changes on 
the enclosure are adequate? 
Res7:lly, 
Mr . Justice Powell 
✓ 
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the press claim to a particular form of access, since the record 
demonstrated that the flow of information to the public, both 
directly and through the press. was adequate to survive consti-
tutional challenge; institutional considerations justified deny-
ing the single, additional mode of access sought by the press in 
tha.t case. 
Here, in contrast, the restrictions on access to the inner 
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this 
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the 
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is 
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of informa-
tion at its source, abridged the public's right to be informed 
about those conditions. 
The answer to that question does not depend upon the 
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of 
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions 
of policy which generally must be resolved by the political 
branches of government.' Moreover, there are unquestionably 
occasions when governmental activity may properly be carried 
on in complete secrecy. For example. the public and the press 
are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our own 
conferences, [a.nd] the meetings of other official bodies gather-
ing in executive session . ... " Branzburg v. Hayes , 408 
U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S., at 834. 1 In such 
situations the reasons for withholding information from the 
public are both apparent and legitimate.~ ~ 
J.'I ;,lrn the case of grand jury proceeding~, for example, the secrecy rule 
has been justified on several grounds: 
"(1) to prevent, the escape of those whose indictment may be contem-
plated ; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its delibera~ 
tions, and to prevent. persons subject to indictment. or their friends from 
importuning the grand ji.1rors ; (3) to prevent. subornation of perjury or· 
tampering with the witnesses who ma.y testify before grand jury and later 
appear at. the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and· 
untrammeled. disclosures by persons who have information with respect to 
the commi!)sion of crime!l; ( 5) to protect innocent a.ccused who is exoner.:.-
:C.n a,qd.i:ti.onJ ~ome ~1.mct.i:on13- o;fl gove:i:inment ~ essent;ia,l to 
the. p;J;iotect;i;on of th.e pub;I,;t,c and t ndee.d o--qr count1t1y t:;:; 
;v;t,t.ql, .i:nte.;r;ie.sts ·": nece.s:sa,!1;1~;1,y, reg:u;t.re. a, large measure of 
sec;r;ec)!•<· ::;-l.lbj ec't to a:pJ?popii~a,te leg±.sla,t j;,,ve oversight. 
• - -
76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED 
Add following footnote on page 17 of printed draft: 
28/ In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n. 15, 
we pointed out: 
"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. 
The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were 
conducted in complete privacy. 1 M. Farrand, The Records of 
the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv (1911). Moreover, 
all records of those meetings were sealed for more than 30 
years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Res. 8 (1818). Most of the Framers acknowledged that 
without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed 
could have been written. C. Warren, The Making of the Con-
stitution 134-139 (1937)." 
In recognizing the valid need for protection of communications 
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist 
them in the performance of their manifold duties, we explained that 
"the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require 
further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect 
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with 
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment 
of the decisionmaking process." Id., at 705. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL S T E V ENS 
~u:prtnu QJ:o-url cf tlft~uh' ~ htltg 
~~Jrittghm. ~- QJ:. 2!JffeJ!~ 
. ' 
....... 
March 21, 1978 
Re: 76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED 
Dear Lewis: 
Needless to say I am most gratified by your 
letter, and I think your concern is entirely 
justified. Do you think the suggested changes on 
the enclosure are adequate? 
~· New 'k. 'le;;' :s ~· 
~ a_ 
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the press claim to a particular form of access. since the record 
demonstra.ted that the flow of information to the public, both 
directly and through the press. ,\;as adequate to survive consti-
tutional challenge; institutional considerations justified deny-
ing the single, additional mode' of access sought by the press in 
that case. · 
Here, in contrast. the restrictions on access to the inner 
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this 
litigation commenced concea]~d from the genera] public the 
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is 
whether petitioner's policies. which cut off the flow of informa-
tion a.t its source. abridged the public's right to be informed 
about those conditions. 
The answer to that question does not depend upon the 
degree of public disclosure which should attend-the operation of 
mos ernmental activity. Such matters involve questions 
o policy hich generally must be resolved by the political 
br so government. Moreover. there are unquestionably 
occasions when governmental activity may properly be carried 
on in complete secrecy. For example. the public and the press 
are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our own _,,,,.,,,. i'f 
conferences, [and] the meetings of other official bodies gather--· 
ing in executive session . ... " Branzburg v. Hn.~08 
U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S .. at 834?.°°£;' s~~h 
situations the reasons for withholding information from the 
public are both apparent and legitimate.~ 7::1./ 
'}!/ ;,(1n the case of &land j~y proceeding~, for ; xample, the secrecy rule 
has been justified on several grounds: 
"(I) to prevent the esc.1pe of those whosP indictment may be contem-
plated; (2) to insure the utmo,:t frpedom to thP grand jury in its delibera-
tions, and to prevent pnsons subject to indictment or their friends from 
importuning thr grand jurors ; (3) to prevent rnbornation of perjury or· 
tampering with the witnesses who may testify bPforr grand jury and later 
appear at the trial of thosP indicted by it ; (4) to rncourage frpe and 
untrammeled clisclo,;ures by person,; who have information with respect to 
the commissiqn of crime:s; (5) to protect. innocent accused who is exoner'-· 
~n ad.di.ti.on., so;rne ;f;!unct,ion.s o;f government "'~ essential to 
the l?;r:-ote.cti;on of t .h.e publ,;i~c and, ~ndeed Ol.lr count!l'.'y '· s 
¥~ta.I ;l'Dtexests ':-:- nec·e.ssa:r;-;i:;l.y, ;r-eguire a .large measure of '"2" 
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Add following footnote on page 17 of printed draft: 
28/ In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 705 n. 15, 
e pointed out: 
... 
"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. 
The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were 
conducted in complete privacy. 1 M. Farrand, The Records of 
the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv (1911). Moreover, 
all records of those meetings were sealed for more than 30 
years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Res. 8 (1818). Most of the Framers acknowledged that 
without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed 
could have been written. C. Warren, The Making of the Con-
stitution 134-139 (1937)." 
I,n rece~i,qj :A.':3 ,l the valid need for protection of communications c,rJ~ 
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist 
them in the performance of their manifold duties, we-e*p±-a--ined..;::- that 
"the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require 
further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect 
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with 
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment 
of the decisionmaking process." Id., at 705. 
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the press claim to a particular form of access, since the record 
demonstrated that the flow of information to the public, both 
directly and through the press. was adequate to survive consti-
tutional cha11enge; institutional con!'ilderations justified deny-
ing the single, additional mode of ac.~ss sought by the press in 
that case.' 
Here, in contrast, the restrictions on access to the inner 
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this 
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the 
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is 
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of informa-
tion at its source. abridged the public's right to be informed 
about those conditions. 
The answer to that question does not depend upon the 
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of 
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions 
of policy which genera11y must be resolved by the political 
branches of government. I J\1oreovN. there are unquestionably 
occasions when governmental acti\·ity may properly be carried 
on in complete secrecy. For example. the public and the press 
are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceedings, our own 
conferences, [and] the meetings of other official bodies gather-
ing in executive session .... " Branzburg v. Hayes, 408. 
U. S. , at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S .. at 834.\ I In such 
situations the reasons for withholding information from the 
public are both apparent and legitimate:-:,-
,..:itt'Jn 1he ra~ of gr:rnd jur>· prorr<'ding:;, for r xample, the ::rrrery rule 
}ias•b("('n jus1ified on se,·rrnl ground,;: 
"(l) to prevrnt- the rsr.1pe of tho:;e who:-;r indic1men1 may be contrm-
plated; (2) to insure thr 111mo,:1 fm·dom to tbr grand jury in i1s ddibera-
tions, and to prrH·nt prr;.:ons !'11bjt>cl to indi ctment or 1heir frirnds from 
importuning thr gra nd jurors; (3) to pn•n·nt :,,ubornation of perjury or· 
tampr ring with thr witnr;.:sc->;:; who may 1f':-tify b r fore grand jury and later 
appra r at. the trial of those indirted by it; (4) to encour:1ge frre and· 
,mt rammeled cli:;rlo:;ures by 1wrsons who ha,·r informa1 ion with re:;1w.ct to 
ihe rornmi5:;ion of crimes; (5) to prott>cl- innorent 11ccu::ed who is rxoner.:.-
w 
In addition, some functions of government - essential 
to the protection of the public and indeed our country's 
vital interests - necessarily require a large measure 30/ 
of secrecy, subject to appropriate legislative oversight. 
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Add following footnote on page 17 of printed draft: 
28/ In United States v. Nixon, . 418 U.S. 683, 705 _ n. 15, 
we pointed outa that the Founders tµemselves followed a policy 
of confidentiality: ' 
"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. 
The meetings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were 
conducted in complete privacy.•• 1 M. Farrand, The Records of 
the Federal Convention of 1787, pp. xi-xxv (1911). Moreover, 
all records of those meetings were sealed for more than 30 
years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 1st 
Sess., Res. 8 (1818). Most of the Framers acknowledged that 
without secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed 
could have been written. C. Warren, The Making of the Con-
stitution 134-139 (1937)." also 
United States v. Nixon, supra, we/recognizej 
nAX&M~the valid need for protection of communications 
between high Government officials and those who advise and assist 
them in the performance of their manifold duties, x~xgx~x~i~g~at 
"the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require 
further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who expect 
public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with 
a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment 
of the decisionmaking process." Id., at 705. 
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·MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, delivered the opinion of the Court. 
The question presented is whether a preliminary injunction 
requiring the Sheriff of Alameda County, Cal., to allow 
representatives of the news media access to the county jail is 
consistent with the holding in Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 
834, that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to 
prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the general 
public." 
Respondent KQED, Inc., operates a public service television 
station in Oakland, Cal. It has televised a number of pro-
grams about prison conditions and prison inmates. KQED 
reporters have been granted access to various correctional 
facilities in the San Francisco Bay area, including San Quentin 
'State Prison, Soledad Prison and the San Francisco County 
Jails at San Bruno and San Francisco, to preparn program 
material. They have taken their cameras and recorqing equip-
ment inside the walls of those institutions and interviewed 
inmates. No disturbances or other problems have occurred on 
those occasions. 
KQED has also reported newsworthy events involving the· 
Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, including a 1972 newscast 
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that the "shocking and debasing conditions which prevailed 
[at Santa Rita] constituted cruel and unusual punishment for 
man or beast as a matter of law." 1 Petitioner is the Sheriff 
of Alameda County and has general supervision and control of 
the Santa Rita facility.2 
On March 31, 1975, KQED reported the suicide of a prisoner 
in the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita jail. That program 
also carried a statement by a psychia.trist assigned to Santa 
Rita to the effect that conditions in the Greystone facility were 
responsible for illnesses of inmates.3 Petitioner's disagree-
ment with that conclusion was reported on the same newscast. 
KQED requested permission to visit and photograph the 
_area of the jail where the suicide occurred. Petitioner refused, 
advising KQED that it was his policy not to permit any access 
to the jail by the news media. 'This policy w.as also invoked 
by petitioner to deny subsequent requests for access to the jail 
in order to cover news stories about conditions and alleged 
· incidents within the facility.4 Except for a carefully super-
vised tour in 1972, the n~ws media were completely excluded 
from the inner portions of the Santa Rita jail until after this 
action was commenced.,ll 
Respondents KQED, and the Alameda and Oakland branches 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
1 See Brenneman v. Madison, 343 F . Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972). 
Based on a personal visit to the facility, Judge Zirpoli reached the 
"inescapable conclusion that Greystone should be razed to the ground." 
2 Petitioner has 'been employed by the Sheriff's Department for 30· 
years, including five as commancling ·officer of the jail at Santa, Rita. He• 
was elected to his present office in 197 4. · 
3 The psychiatrist was· discharged after the telecast. 
4 Access was denied , for example, to cover stories of aJleged gang rapes· 
and poor physical conditions within the jail, Tr. 208, and of recent escapes · 
from t.he jail, Tr: 135-136. 
5 A previous sheriff had conducted one "press tour" in 1972, attended 
by reporters and c~meramen. But the facility had been "freshly scrubbed'" 
for the tour and the reporters were forbidden to ask any questions of the.: 
lPJP.ates_ the): enoo~Jlter_ed, (Al?l?· 16-17.)._ 
-
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People,6 filed their complaint for equitable relief on June 17, 
1975. The complaint alleged that petitioner ha.cl provided no 
"means by which the public may be informed of conditions 
prevailing in Greystone or by which prisoners' grievances ma.y 
reach the public." lt further alleged that petitioner's policy 
of "denying KQED and the public" access to the jail facility 
violateq the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti-
tution and requested the court to enjoin petitioner "from 
excluding KQED news personnel from the Greystone cells and 
Santa Rita, facilities and generally preventing full and accurate 
news coverage of the conditions prevailing therein." App. 6-7. 
With the complaint, respondents filed a motion for a prelim-
in1:1,ry injunction, supported by affidavits of representatives of 
the news meqia, tqe ·sheriff of ·san Francisco County, and the 
attorney for respondents. The affidavits of the news media 
representatives and the sheriff described the news coverage in 
other penaJ institutions and uniformly expressfld the opinion 
that such cqverage had no harmful consequences and in faot 
served a significant public purpose.7 
6 The NAACP alleged a "srecial concern with conditions at Sant.a Rita 
because the prisoner population at t.he jail is disproportionately black, and 
the members of the 'NAACP depend on the news media for information 
about conditions in the jail so that they can meaningfully pa.rticipate in 
the current public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County." Com-
plaint Paragraph 3. 
Since no special relief was requested by or granted to the NAACP, the 
parties have focused on the claim of KQED. 
7 The sheriff has a master's degree in criminology froµi the University 
of California at Berkeley and 10 years experience in law en,forcement 
with the San Francisco Police Depa.rtment. As sheriff he has genera[ 
supervision and control over the jail facilities in San Francisco. He 
expressed the "opinion, based on my education and experience in Jaw 
enforcement and jail administration, that such programs made an impor-
tant contribution to public understanding of jails and jail conditions. Irt 
my opinion jails are public institutio11s and the public has a right to know 
what is being done with their tax dollars being spent on iail facilit.i.es an,d 
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The affidavit of the a,ttorney for KQED described a series of 
telephone conversations with counsel for the County between 
May 12, 1975 and June 17, when this suit was filed. In the 
first conversation, respondents' counsel expla.ined KQED's 
problem regarding access to the Santa Rita facility. In the 
second, County Counsel stated that a rule or regulation regard-
ing press access would be forthcoming within a week. In the 
third conversation, more than two weeks later, County Counsel 
stated that no access rule had yet been developed, and agreed 
to forward a copy of the prison rules which were then in effect 
for maximum security inmates.8 1 In the last communication, 
on June 10, 1975. County Counsel stated that petitioner was 
contemplating m~nthly public tours for 25 persons, with the 
first tour tentatively scheduled for July 14. The tours, how-
ever, would not include the cell portions of Greystone and 
would not allow any use of cameras or communication with 
inmates. Respondents filed suit on June 17, 1975. 
In a letter to the County Board ofSupervisors dated June 19, 
1975, petitioner outlined a pilot public tour program along the 
lines of that described to respondents' counsel. The Board 
approved six tours. Petitioner then filed his answer and sup-
porting affidavit explaining why he had refused KQED access 
to the jail and identifying the recent changes in policy regard-
ing access to the jail and communica.tion between inmates and 
persons on the outside. Petitioner stated that if KQED's 
request had been granted, he would have felt obligated to 
honor similar requests from other representatives of the press 
and this could have disrupted mealtimes, exercise times, visit-
ing times, and court appearances of inmates.9 He pointed out 
8 The inmates at Santa Rita include pretail detainees as well as prisoners 
who have · been convicted and sentenced. The rnles in effect on June 3, 
1975, contained no rule on vre,;s access. Visiting was limited to three 
bours on Sunday. All outgoing mail, ~xcept letters to judges or lawyers, 
was inspected. The rule prohibited any mention of "the names or actions 
10f any officers~' of the jajJ. 
~ In c0J1t,rn.st to foe floodgate concerns exprns;;ed by vetitioners, th~ 
-
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that the mail regulations had recently been amended to delete 
a prohibition against mentioning the qames or actions of any 
correctional officers. Petitioner also stated that KQED had 
been advised about the contemplated program of guided tours 
before the suit was filed and that the tours had since been 
approved and publicly announced. With respect to the scope 
of the proposed tours, petitioner explained th~t the use or 
cameras would be prohibited because it would not be possible 
to prevent 25 persons with cameras from photographing 
inmates and security operations. Moreover, communication 
with inm11,tes would not be permitted because of excessive time 
consumption, "problems with control" of inmates and visitors, 
and a belief "that interviews would be excessively unwieldy." 10 
An evidentiary hearing on tpe motion for a preliminary 
injunction was held after the first four guided tours had taken 
place. The evidence revealed the inadequacy of the tours as a 
means of obtaining infotmation about the inmates and their 
conditions of confinement for transmission to the public. The 
tours failed to enter certain areas of the jail.11 They afforded 
no opportunity to photograph conditions within the facility, 
and the photographs which the County offered for sale to tour 
visitors omitted certain jail characteristics, such as catwalks 
abov~ the cells from which guards can observe the inmates.12 
The tours provided no opportunity to question randomly 
encountered inmates about jaii conditions. Indeed, to the 
Information Officer at San Quentin testified that after the liberalization of 
access rules at that instittitiop. media requests to enter the facility a,ctually 
declined. Tr. 152. This testimony may suggest tha,t the mere existence 
of inflexible access barriers generates a concern that conditions within the 
closed institution require especially close scrutiny. 
:io App., a,t 24. 
11 The tour did not include LitUe Greystone, which was the subject ot 
reports of beatings, rapes and poor cop.ditions, or the disciplina.ry cells. 
12 There were also no photos of the women's cells, of the "safety cell,'" 
of the "disciplin11,ry cells," or of t he interior of LittJe Greystone. In addi-
i ion, the photograph of the dayroom omits the television monjt:0r that. 
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extent possible inmates were kept out of sight during the tour, 
preventing the tour visitors from obtaining a realistic picture 
of the conditions of confinement within the jail. In addition, 
the fixed scheduling of the tours prevented coverage of news-
worthy events at the jail. 
Of most importance, all of the remaining tours were com-
pletely booked and there was no assurance that any tour would 
be conducted after December of 1975. The District Court 
found that KQED had no access to the jail ~d that the broad 
restraints on access were not required by legitimate penological 
·in terests.13 
u "Sheriff Houchins admitted that because Santa Rita has never experi-
mented with a more liberal pre.~s policy than that presently in existence, 
there is no record of press disturbances. Furthermore, the Sheriff has no 
recollection of hearing uf any disruption caused by the media at other 
penal institutions. Nevertheless Sheriff Houchins stated that he fea.red 
that invasion of inmates• privacy, creation of jail 'celebrities,' and threats 
· of jail security would result from a more liberal press policy. While such 
fears are not groundless, convincing testimony was offered that such fears 
' can be substantially allayed. 
"As to the inmates' privacy, the media, representatives commonly obtain 
written consent from those inmates who are interviewed and/or photo-
. graphed, and coverage of inmates is never provided without their full 
agreement. As to pre-trial detainees who could be harmed by pre-trial 
publicity, consent can be obtajned not only from such inmates but also 
from their counsel. J ail 'celebrities' are not likely to emerge as a result, 
of a random interview policy. Regarding jail security, any cameras and 
equipment brought, into the jail can be searched. yVhile Sheriff Houchins 
expressed concern that photographs of electronic locking devices could be 
· enlarged and studied in order to facilitate escape plans, he admit.tee! that 
the inmates themselves ciln study and sketch the locking devices. Most 
importantly, there was substantial tRStimony to the effect that ground 
rules laid down by jail administ.rators, such as a biln on photographs of 
security devices, are consistently respected by t,he media. 
"Thus, upon reviewing the evidence concerning the present media. policy 
at Santa Rita, the Court. finds the plaintiffs have demonstra.ted irreparable 
injury, absence of an adequate remedy at law, probability of success on 
the merits, a favorable public interest , and a balance of hardships which 
to.ust be st.ruck in plaintiffs' favor." App,, at 69. 
-
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The District Court thereafter issued ft preliminary injunc-
tion, enjoining petitioner "from denying to KQED news 
personnel and responsible representatives of the news media 
access to the Santa Rita facilities, including Greystone, at 
reasonable times and hours," or from preventing such repre-
sentatives "frqm utilizing photographic and sound equipment 
or from utilizing inmate interviews in providing full and 
accurate coverage of the Santa Rita facilities." The court, 
however, recognized that petitioner should determine the 
specific means of implementing the order and, in any event, 
should retain the right to de~iy access when jail tensions or 
other special circumstances require exclusion. 
Petitioner took an interlocutory appeal to the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.14 The Court of 
Appeals a.ffirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse 
its discretion in framing the preliminary injunction under 
review.15 MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST, acting as Circuit Justice, 
stayed the mandate and in his opinion on the stay application 
fairly stated the legal issue we subsequently granted certiorari 
to decide: 
"The legal issue to be raised by applicant's petition for 
certiorari seems quite clear. If the 'no greater access' 
doctrine of Pell and Saxbe applies to this case, the Court 
of . Appeals and the District Court were wrong, and the 
injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other 
hand, the holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly 
limited to the situation where there already existed sub-
stantial press and public access to the prison, then PeU 
and Saxbe are not necessarily dispositive, and review by 
this Court of the propriety of the injunction, in light of 
14 Two circuit judges granted a stay of the Dist-rict Court's order pend-
ing disposit.ion of petitioner's a.ppeal. 
15 546 F. 2d 284 ( 1976). A petition for rehearing, a suggestion for 
Tehearing en bane, and a motion to stay· the mandate were all denied by 
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those cases, would be appropriate, although not neces~ 
sary." 429 U.S. 1341, 1344. 
For two reasons, which shall be discussed separately, the 
decisions in Pell and Sa:cbe do not control the propriety of the 
District Court's preliminary injunction. First, the unconsti-
tutionality of petitioner's policies which gave rise to this 
litigation does not rest on the premise that the press has a 
·greater right of access ·to information regarding prison condi-
tions than do other members of the public. Second, reiief 
·tailored to the needs of the press may properly be awarded ~ 
:a representative of the press which is successful in proving that 
it has been harmea by a constitutional violation and need not 
·await the grant 'of relief to members of the general public who 
may also have been injwed by petitioner's unconstitutional 
access policy but ·have ndt y~t sought to vindicate their rights. 
I 
This litigation grew out of petitioner's refusal to allow 
representatives of the press access to the inner portions of the 
'Santa Rita facility. Following those refusals and the institu-
tion of this suit, certain remedial action was taken by peti-
tioner. The mail censorship was relaxed and an experimental 
tour program was initiated. As a preliminary matter, there-
fore we must consider the relevance of the actions after 
March 31, 1975, to the question whether a consdtutional vio-
lation had occurred. 
It is well settled that a defendant's corrective action in 
anticipation of litigation or following commencement of suit 
does not deprive the court of power to decide whether the 
previous course of conduct was unlawful. See United St(l,tes 
v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U. S. 629 and cases cited, at 632-633.1~ 
16 Moreover, along with the power to decide the merits, the Court's: 
power to grant injunctive relief survives the discontinuance of illegal con-
dttct. "It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunc..-
tive relief by protesta.tions of repentance and reform, especially wheitc 
-
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'The propriety of the court's exercise of that power in this case 
is apparent. When this suit was filed , there were no public 
-tours. Petitioner enforced a policy of virtually total exclusion 
of both the public and the press from those areas within the 
Santa Rita jail where the inmates were confined. At that time 
petitioner also enforced a policy of reading all inmate corre-
·spondence addressed to persons other than lawyers and judges 
•and censoring those portions that related to the conduct of the 
•guards who controlled their daily existence. Prison policy as 
well as prison walls significantly abridged the opportunities for 
communication of information about the conditions of confine-
ment in the ·Santa Rita facility to the public.11 Therefore, 
abandonment seems timed to anticipate suit, and there is a. probability of 
•resumption." United States v. 'Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326, 
333. When the District Court. issued the prelimina,ry injunction, there was 
no assurance that the experiment.al public tours would continue beyond 
the next month. Thus, it wotllti certainly have been reasonable for the 
court to assume that, absent injunctive relief, the access to the inner por-
·tions of the Santa Rita facility would soon be reduced to its prelitigation 
level. 
17 Thus, when this suit was filed , there existed no opportunity for out-
siders to observe the living conditions of the inmates at. Santa Rita. And 
the mail regulations prohibited statements :..bout the character of the 
treatment of prisoners· by correctional officers. 
We cannot agree with petitioner that t he inmates' visitation and tele-
phone privileges were reasonable alternative means of informing the pub-
lic at large about conditions within Santa Rit:t. Neither offered an oppor-
·tunit.y to observe •those,conditions. Even if a member of the general pub-
lic or a representative of the press were fortunate enough to obtajn the 
name of an inmate to visit, access to the facility would not have included 
the inmate's place of confinement. The jajl regulations do not indicate 
that, an inmate in the minimum security portion of the jail may enlist 
the aid of Social Service Officers to telephone the press or members of the 
general public to complain of the conilitions of confinement . App. 38. 
Ever~ if a maximum security inmate mny make collect telephone oalls, it 
· is unlikely that a member of the general public or representative of the 
press would accept the charges, especially without prior knowledge of tllf) 
,,call's communicative purpose. 
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even if there would not have been any constitutional violation 
·had the access policies adopted by petitioner following com-
mencement of this litigation been in effect all along, it was 
appropriate for the District Court to decide whether the 
restrictive rules in effect when KQED first requested access 
were constitutional. 
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 834, the Court stated 
that "newsmen ha.ve no constitutional right of access to prisons 
or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." 
But the Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory 
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press from 
access to information about prison conditions would avoid 
constitutional scrutiny;18 Indeed, Pell itself strongly suggests 
the contrary. 
cumstances, pretrial detainees may, according to petitioner, be interviewed 
with the consents of the inmates', defense coun,sel and prosecutor and with 
an order from fhe court,. Not only would such an interview take place 
outside the confines of the jail, ·but. the requirement of a court order makes 
this a patently inadequate means of keeping the public informed about the 
jail and its inmates. 
Finally, petitioner suggests his willingness to provide the press with 
infonnation regarding the release of prisoners which, according to peti-
tioner, would permit interviews of former prisoners regarding the condi-
tions of their recent confinement. This informal offer was apparently only 
made in response to respondents' lawsuit. Moreover, it too fails to afford 
the public any opportunity to observe t11e conditions of confinement . 
He11ce, the mea ns available at the time this suit was instituted for 
informing the gE'neral public a.bout conditions in the Santa Rita jail were, 
as a practical·matter, nonexist~mt. 
18 In Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17, the Court said: 
"The right to speak and pub lish does not carry with it the unrestrained· 
right to gather informat ion." (Emphasis added.) 
And in Branibu7'g v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,681: 
"We do not question the significance of free sprech, press, or assembly 
to the country's welfa re. Nor is it suggested that news gathering does not 
· qualify for First Amendment protection ; without some protection for seek-
ing out the news, freedom of the press could be eviscera.ted." 
"Both statements imply that there is a right to acquire knowledge that 
-
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In that case, representatives of the press claimed the right to 
interview specifica.lly designa~d inmates. In evaluating this 
claim, the Court did not simply inquire whether prison officials 
allowed members of the general public to conduct such inter-
views. Rather, it canvl:l,Ssed the opportunities already avail-
able for both the public and the press to acquire information 
regarding the prison and its inmates. And the Court found 
that the policy of prohibiting interviews with inmates specif-
ically designated by the press was "not part of an attempt by 
the state to conceal the conditions in its prisons." The chal-
lenged restriction on access, which was imposed only after 
experience revealed that such interviews posed disciplinary 
problems, was an isolated limitation on the efforts of the press 
to gather information a.bout those conditions. It was against 
the background of a record which demonstra.ted that both the 
press and the general public were "accorded full opportunities 
to observe prison conditions," 19 that the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the single restraint on access challenged 
in Pell . 
The decision in Pell, therefore, does not imply that a state 
policy of concealing prison conditions from the press, or a 
policy denying the press any opportunity to observe those 
conditions, could have been justified simply by pointing to like 
' 
derives protection from the First Amendment. See Branzburg, supra, at 
728 n. 4, STEWART, J., dis&mting. 
19 "The Department of Corrections regularly conducts public tours 
t hrough the prisons for the benefit of interest,ed citizens. In addition, 
newsmen are permitted to visit both the maximum security and minimum 
security sections of the institutions and to stop and speak about any sub-
ject to any inmates whom they might encounter. If security considera-
tions permit, corrections personnel will step aside to permit such interviews 
to be confidential. Apart from general access to all parts of the institu-
tions, newsmen are also permitted to enter the prisons to interview inmates 
selected at random by the corrections officials. By the same token, if a 
newsman wishes to write a. story on a particular prison program, he is 
permitted to sit in on group meetings and to interview the inmate pa.r. 
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concealment from, and denial to, the general public. If that 
were not true, there would have been no need to emphasize 
the substantial press and public access reflected in the record 
of that case.20 What Pell does indicate is that the question 
whether respondents established a probability of prevailing on 
their constitutiona.l claim is inseparable from the question 
whether petitioner's policies unduly restricted the oppor-
tunities of the general public to learn about the conditions of 
confinement in Santa Rita jail. As in Pell, in assessing its 
adeqµacy, the totaJ access of the public and the press must 
be considered. 
Here, the broad restraints on access to information regarding 
operation of the jail that prevailed on the date this suit was 
instituted are p1ainly disclosed by the record. The public and 
the press had consistently been denied any access to those· 
20 Nor would it have been necessary to note, as the Pell opinion did, the 
fact that the First Amendment protects the free flow of information to 
the public: 
"The constitutional guarantee of a. free press 'assures the maintenance· 
of our political system and an open society,' Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U. S .. 
374, 389 (1967), and secures 'tjie paramount, public interest in a free flow 
of information t.o the people concerning public officials,' Garrison v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) . See also New York '.('imes Co. v. Sullivan, 
376 U. S. 254 (1964). By the same token, '[a]ny system of prior re-
straints of expression comes to this CQurt bearing a, heavy presumption 
agaillh't its constitutional validity.' New York Times Co. v. United States, 
403 U. S. 713,-714 (1971); ·organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 
U.S. 415 (1971) ; Bantam Books, Inc . v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963); 
Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U. S. 697 (1931). Correla.tively, 
the First and Fourteenth Amendments also protect the right of the public 
t.o receive such infonnation and ideas as are published. Kleindienst v. 
Mandel, 408 U. S., at .. 762-763; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U. S. 557, 564 
' (1969) . 
"In Brmizburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972), the Court went further 
and acknowledged that 'news gathering is not without its First Amend-
ment protections,' id., at 707, for 'without some protection for seeking out 
the news, freedom of the press could be eviscerated,' id., at 681.'' 41 r 
·lJ:~.s.,.at. 832.,-833 •. 
-
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portions of the Santa Rita facility where inmates were confined 
and there had been excessive censorship of inmate corre-
spondence. Petitioner's no-access policy, modified only in the 
wake of respondents' resort to the courts, could survive consti-
tutional scrutiny only if the Constitution affords no protection 
to the public's right to be informed about conditions within 
those public institutions where some of its members are con-
fined because they have been charged with or found guilty of 
criminal offenses. 
II 
The preservation of a full and free flow of information to 
the general public has long been recognized as a core objective 
of the First Amendment to the Constitution.21 It is for this 
reason that the First Amendment protects not only the dis-
semination but also the receipt of information and ideas. See, 
e. g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 
425 U.S. 748, 756; Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-
409; Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U. S. 753, 762-763.22 Thus, 
in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, the Court invalidated prison 
regulations authorizing excessive censorship of outgoing inmate 
correspondence because such censorship abridged the rights of 
the intended recipients. See also Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F. 
2d 1335, 1346, n. 8 (CA7 1973). So here, petitioner's preliti-
gation prohibition on mentioning the conduct of jail officers in 
outgoing correspondence must be considered an impingement 
21 See, e. g., Virginia Pharmacy Board v. Virginia Consumer Council, 
425 U. S. 748, 764-765; Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U. S. 64, 77 ; New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266-270 ; Associated Press v . United 
States, 326 U. S. 1, 20 ; Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, 250. 
See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S. 665, 726 n. 2 (STEWAR'r, J., 
dissenting.) 
22 See also Lamont v. Postmaster General,, 381 U. S. 301; Red Lion 
Broadcasting Co. v. /?CC, 395 U. S. 367, 390 ; Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 
557, 564; Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 ; Marsh v. Alabama, 
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on the noninmate correspondent's interest in receiving the 
intended communication. 
In addition to safeguarding the right of one individual to 
receive what another elects to communicate, the First Amend-
ment serves an essential societal function. 23 • Our system of 
self-government_ assumes the existence of an informed citi-
zenry.24 As Madison wrote : 
"A popular Government, without popular information 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or 
a tragedy; or perha.ps both. Knowledge will forever gov-
ern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own 
governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge 
gives." Writings of Jarpes Madison f03 (G. Hurst ed. 
1910). 
It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channels of communica-
tion be free of governmental -restraints. Without some pro-
23 "What is at stake here is the societal function of the First Amend-
ment in preserving free public discussion ·of governmental affairs. No 
· aspect of that constitution.al guarantee is more treasured than its protec-
tion of the a.bility of our people throu~h free and open debate to consider· 
and resolve their own destiny .... ·it embodies our Na.tion's commit-
ment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith tha.t the surest 
course for developing sound national policy lies in a free exchange of views 
as public issues. And ·public debate must not only be unfettered; it must 
also be informed. For that reason this Court has repeatedly stated that 
First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas 
as well as the right of free expression.'r Sa:xb·e v. Washington Post Co., 
417 U. S. 843, 862-863 (POWELL, J ., dissenting) . 
24 See A. Meiklejohn, ·Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 
26 (1948) : 
"Just as far as . .. the· citizen,s who are to decide an issue are denied · 
· acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criti-
, cism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-
considered, ill-balanced planning, for the general good. It is that mutila- -
tion of the thinking process of the community against which the First.' 
.Am-endment to the Constitution is directed. 
-
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tection for the acquisition of information about the operation 
of public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the 
process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would 
be stripped of its substance.25 
For that reason information-gathering is entitled to some 
measure of constitutional protection. See, e. g., Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,681; Pell v. Procun'ier, 417 U.S., at 833; 
"a right to gather news, of some dimensions, must exist." 26 
As this Court's decisions clearly indicate, however, this protec-
tion is not for the private benefit of those who might qualify 
as representatives of the "press" but to insure that the citizens 
are fully informed regarding matters of public interest and 
importance. 
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, represent-
atives of the "press" challenged a state tax on the advertising 
revenues of newspapers. In the Court's words, the issue raised 
by the tax went "to the heart of the natural right of the 
members of an organized society, united for their common 
good, to impart and acquire information about their common 
interests." / d., at 243. The opinion described the long struggle 
25 Admittedly, the right to receive or a,cquire information is not specifi-
cally mentioned in the Constitution. But "the protection of the Bill of 
Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from ... abridge-
ment those equally fundamental personal rights necessary to make the 
express guarantees fully meaningful. . . . The dissemiruttion of ideas can 
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing adherents are not, free to receive 
and consider them. It would be a. barren marketplace of ideas that had 
only sellers and no buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U. S., at 
380 (BRENNAN, J., concurring) . It. would be an even more barren market-
place that had willing buyers and sellers and no meaningful information 
to exchange. 
26 See Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 727 (STEWART, J., dissenting): 
"No less important to the news disseininat,ion process is the ga,thering of 
information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for 
without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be 
impermissibly compromised. A,ccordingly, a right to gather news, of 
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in England against the stamp tax and tax on advertisements-
the so-called "taxes on know ledge" : 
"[I]n the adoption of the ... [taxes] the dominant and 
controlling aim was to prevent, or curtail the opportunity 
for, the acquisition of knowledge ·by the people in respect 
of their governmental affairs. , . . The aim of the strug-
gle {against those taxes] was ... to establish and pre-
serve the right of the English people to full information in 
respect of the doings or misdoings of their government. 
Upon the correctness of this conclusi911, the very charac-
terizations of the exactions as .... 'taxes on knowledge' sheds 
a flood of corroborative light. In the ultimate, an in-
formed and eri:lightened public opinion was the thing at 
stake." Id., at "247. 
Noting the familiarity of the Framers with this struggle, 
the Court held: 
"[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of 
all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or 
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press 
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. 
The tax involved here is bad . . . because, in light of its 
history and its present setting. it is seen to be a deliberate 
and calculated device . . . to limit the circulation of 
information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the 
constitutional guaranties." Id. , at 250. 
A recognition that the "underlying right is the right of the 
public generally" 21 is also implicit in the doctrine that "news-
men have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their 
inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U. S., at 834. In Pell it was unnecessary to 
consider the extent of the public's right of access to informa-
tion regarding the prison and its inmates in order to adjudicate 
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the press olaim to a particular form of access, since the record 
demonstrated that the flow of information to the public, both 
directly and through the press, was adequate to survive consti-
tutional cµaUenge; institutional considerations justified deny-
ing the single, additional mode of access sought by the press in 
that case. 
Here, in contrast. the restrictions on access to the inner 
portions of the Santa Rita jail that existed on the date this 
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the 
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is 
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of informa-
tion ,at its source. abridged the public's right to be informed 
about those conditions. 
The answer to that question does not depend upon the 
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of 
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions 
of policy which generally must be resolved by the political 
branches of government.28 Moreover, there are unquestion-
ably occasions when governmental activity may properly be 
carried on in complete secrecy. For example, the public and 
the press are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceed-
ings, our own conferences, [and] the meetings of other official 
bodies gathering in executive session .... " Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 834.21) 
28 In United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 n. 15, we pointed out 
that the Founders themselves followed a policy of confidentiality: 
"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. The meet-
ings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete 
privacy. 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 
pp xi-xxv (1911). Moreover, all records of those meetings were sealed 
for more than 30 years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 
1st Sess., Res. 8 (1818). Most- of the Framers acknowledged that without 
secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have been 
written. C. Warren, The Making of tJ10 Constitution 134-139 (1937) ." 
29 In the case of grand jury proceedings, for example, the secrecy rule 
bas been justified on several grounds : 
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In addition , some functions of government--essential to 
the protection of the public and indeed our country's vital 
interests-necessarily require a large measure of secrecy, sub-
ject to appropriate legislative oversight.30 In such situations 
the reasons for withholding information from the public are 
both apparent and legitima.te. 
In this case, however, "[r]espondents do not assert a right 
to force disclosure of confidential information or to invade in 
any way the decisionmaking processes of governmental offi-
cials." 31 They simply seek an end to petitioner's policy of 
concealing prison conditions from the public. Those condi-
tions a.re wholly without claim to confidenti11lity. While prison 
officials have an interest in the time and manner of public 
acquisition of information about the institutions they admin-
ister, no one even suggests that there is any legitimate, 
· penological justification for concealing from citizens the condi-
tions in which their fellow citizens are being confined.32 
plated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its delibera-
tions, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from 
importuning the grand ' jurors ; (3) to prevent suborna.t ion of perjury or 
tampering with the witnesses who ma.y testify before grand jµry and later 
appear a.t the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and 
untrammeled disclosures by persons who have in.formation with respect to 
the commission of crimes ; (5) to protect innocent a.ccused who is exoner-
ated from disclosure of the fact. that he has been under investigation, and 
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of 
guilt,." United States v. Procter & Gamble. 356 U. S. 677, 681 n. 6. 
30 In United States v. Nixon, s-upra, we also recognized the valid need 
for protection of communicat.ions between high Government officials and 
those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold 
duties, explaining t-hat "the importarice of this confidentiality is too plain 
to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who 
expect public disseminat ion of their remarks may well temper candor 
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detri-
ment of the decisionmaking process." Id .. at 705. 
31 Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U. S., at 861 (POWELL, J., 
dissenting) . 
32 The Court in Saxbe noted that " 'prisons are institutions where pub- . 
-
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The reasons which militate in favor of providing special 
protection to the flow of information to the public about 
prisons relate to the unique function they perform in a demo-
cratic society. Not only are they public institutions, financed 
with public funds and administered by public servants; 33 
they are an integral component of the criminal justice system. 
The citizens confined therein are tempora.rily, and sometimes 
permanently, deprived oi their liberty as a result of a trial 
which must conform to the dictates of the Constitution. By 
express command of the Sixth Amendment the proceeding 
,must be a "public trial. 1' 34 It is important not only that the 
trial itself be fair, but also that the community at large have 
confidence in the integrity of the proceeding. 3 " That public 
interest survives the judgment of conviction and appropriately 
carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is 
treated during his period of punishment and hoped-for rehabil-
lie access is generally limited.' " 417 U. S., at 849 (citation omitted). 
This truism reflects the fact that there are legitimate penological inter-
ests served by regulating access, e. g., security and conlinement. But con-
ooa.Iing prison conditions from the public is not one of those legitimate 
objectives. 
33 "The administration of these institutions, the effectiveness of their 
rehabilitative programs, the conditions of confinement that, they maintain, 
and t,he experiences of the individuals in carcerated therein a.re all matters 
of legitimate societal interest and concern." Saxbe v. Washing ton Post Co., 
417 U.S., at 861 (Pow"ELL, J., dissenting). 
34 In all criminal prosecut,ions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public ttjal, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein t.he crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and 
cause of the accusations; ... " U . S. Const., Amend. VI. 
35 "The right to a public trial is not only to protect the accused but to 
protect as much the public''s right to k~ow what goes on when men's lives 
and liberty are at stake .... " Lewis v. Peyton, 352 F. 2d 791, 792 (CA4 
1965). See also In re Oliver, 333 U. S. 257, 270: "The knowledge that 
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of 
-public opinion is an effective restraint QU possible abuse of judicial power.'' 
- -
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itation. While a ward of the State and subject to its stern 
discipline, he retains constitutional protections against cruel 
and unusual punishment, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 
97, a protection which may derive more practical support from 
access to information about prisons by the public than by 
occasional litigation in a busy court." 0 
Some inmates-in Santa Rita, a substantial number-are 
pretrial detainees. Though confined pending trial , they have 
not been convicted of an offense against society and are 
entitled to the presumption of innocence. Certain penologjca:.1 
objectives, i. e., punishment. deterrence and rehabilitation, 
which are legitimate in regard to convicted prisoners, are inap-
plicable to pretrial detainees."' Society has a special interest 
in ensuring that unconvicted ·citizens are treated in accord with 
their sta.tus. 
In this case, the record demonstrates that both the public 
and the press had been consistently denied any access to the 
inner portions of the Santa Rita jail, that there had been 
excessive censorship of inmate correspondence, and that there 
was no valid justification for these broad restraints on the flow 
of information. An affirmative answer to the question whether 
36 In fact, conditions within the GrPystone portion of thP Santa Rita · 
facility had been found to con:stitnt€ cniel and unusual punishment . . 
Brenneman v. Mailigan, 343 F. Supp.128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972). The 
public's inter est in ensuring that tlwse conditions have been remedied is 
apparent. For, in finaJ analysis, it ii:l the cit izens who bear responsibility 
for the treatment accorde·d those confined within penal institutions. 
37 "Incarceration aft.er conviction is imposed to punish, to deter, and to 
rehabilitate the convict.. . . . Some freedom to accomplish the:;<" ends must 
of necessity be alfordpd prison pen;onn<"l. Convers<"l?, whel'E' incarceration 
is imposed prior to conviction, deterrence, puni8hment,, :md rPtribution 
are not legitimate funct,ions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is 
but a temporary holding operation , and the-ir neces,,;ary frPedom of action 
is concomitantly diminished. . . . Punitive measures in such a context are 
·out of harmony with thP presumption of in,nocence." Anderson v. Nasser, 
4'38 F:. 2d 183; 190 (CA5 1971 ) .. 
-
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respondent established 11, likelihood of prevailing on the merits 
did not depend, in final analysis, on any right of the press to 
special treatment beyond that accorded the public at large. 
Rather, the probable existence of a constitutional violation 
rested upon the special importance of allowing a democratic 
community access to knowledge about how its servants were 
treating some of its members who have been committed to 
their custody. An official prison policy of concealing such 
knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of 
information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and 
of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution.as 
III 
The preliminary injunction entered by the District Court 
granted relief to KQED without providing any specific remedy 
for other members of the public. Moreover, it imposed duties 
on petitioner that may not be required by the Constitution 
itself. The injunction was not an abuse of discretion for 
either of these reasons. 
If a litigant can prove that he has suffered specific harm 
from the application of an unconstitutional policy, it is 
entirely proper for a court to gran~ relief tailoreq to his needs-
without attempting to redress all the mischief that the policy 
may have worked on others. Though the public and the press 
have an equal right to receive information and ideas, different 
methods of remedying a violation of that right may sometimes 
be needed to accommodate the special concerns of the one or 
the other. Preliminary relief could therefore appropriafely be 
38 When fundamental freedoms of citizens have been at stake, the Court 
has recognized that a.n abridgement of those freedoms may follow from a 
wide variety of governmental policies. See, e. g., American Communica-
tions Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449; 
Boyd v. United Stat_es, 116 U .. S .. 6J6,; G.rosiean v.. American Press Co., 291 
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awarded to KQED on the basis of its proof of how it was 
affected by the challenged policy without also granting specific 
relief to the general public. Indeed, since our adversary 
system contemplates the adjudication of specific controversies 
between specific litigants, it woµld have been improper for the 
District Court to attempt to provide a remedy to persons who 
have not requested separate relief. Accordingly, even though 
the Constitution provides the press with no greater right of 
access to information than that possessed by the public at 
large, a preliminary injunction is not invalid simply because it 
awards special retief to a successful litigant which is a repre-
sentative of the press.31) 
Nor is there anything novel about injunctive relief which 
goes beyond a mere prohibition against repetition of previous 
unlawful conduct. In situations which are both numerous and 
varied the chancellor has required a wrongdoer to take affirma-
tive steps to eli.ininate the effects of a violation of law even 
though the law itself imposes- no duty to take the remedial 
39 Moreover, the relief granted to KQED will redound to the benefit of 
members of the public interested in obtaining information about condi-
tions in the Santa Rita jail . The press may have }lo grea,t.er constitut ional 
right to information about prisons than that possessed by the general pub-
lic. But when the press does a.cqui re information and disseminate it to 
the public, it performs :m important societ.a.l function. 
"In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the pub-
lic at large. · It is the means by which the people receive t hat free flow of 
information and· ideas essential to inte1ligent self-government. By enabl-
ing the public to assert meaningful cont rol over the politica.I process, the 
press performs a critical function in effecting the societal purpose of the 
First Amendment." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co ., 417 U.S., at, 863-864 
(PowELL, J., dissenting) . 
See also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U. S., at 726-727 (STEWART, J ., 
dissenting) . 
In the coqtext of fashioning a, remedy for a violation of rights p rotected 
by the First. Amendment, consideration of the role of the press in our 
~ iety is appropriate. 
-
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action decreed by the court.4° It follows that if prison regula-
tions and policies have unconstitutionally suppressed informa-
tion and interfered with communication in viqlation of the 
First A1n~ndment, the District Court has the power to require, 
at least temporarily, that the channels of communication be 
opened more widely than the law would otherwise require in 
order to let relevapt facts, which may have been concealed, 
come to light. Whether or not final relief along the lines of 
that preliminarily awarded in this case would be "aptly tai-
lored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional viola-
tion ," Milliken v. ].3radley, 433 U. S. 267, 287, lt is perfectly 
clear that the Court had power to enter an inj~nction which 
was broader than a mere prohibition against ~lle~al conduct. 
The Court of Appeals found no reason to question the-
specific preliminary relief ordered by the District Court. Nor 
would it be appropriate for us to review the scope of the 
ordef.41 The order was preliminary in character, and is subject 
to revision in the light of experience and such evidence and 
argument as m1ty be presented before the litigation is finally 
concluded. 
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is 
Affirmed. 
MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL and MR. JusTICE BLACKMUN took 
no part in the consideration or decision of this case. 
4° For au exteI1Sive d'iscussion of this practice in the context of desegre--
gation decrees, see the Court's opi11ion last Term in Milliken v. Bradley, 
433 u. s. 267. 
41 We note, however, that the Dist rict Court was presented with sub-
·stantial evidence indicat.ing that the use of cameras and interviews with 
randomly selected in,mates neither jeopardized security nor threatened'. 
legitimate penological interests in ot.her prisons where such access wa~; 
~rmitt®,. SEl.El. Pr.ocunier v. :Martinez, 416, U. S.,, a.t 4.14 n .. 14. 
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March 23, 1978 
No. 76-1310 Houchins v. KQED 
John: 
Pl ease 1o i n' me. 
Justice Stevens 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Confernce 
r-
CHAMBERS Of" 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
Dear John: 
-..§lt}Jt'mtt ~llltrl ttf tJrt ~nittb ~htttg 
~attfring~ ~- ~- 21lpJl.~ 
March _28, 1978 
Re: 76-1310 Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 
✓ 
I will be writing in this case. If my 
position does not cover the views of Byron and 
Bill Rehnquist, they,too,may have something to say. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
cc: The Conference 
Regards, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -~u:pr.cmt~!lltrlof~t%rifth~fa±tg 
'Jl}'as lytnghtn, tB. cq. 2!lc?J.!. .;l 
/ 
April 24, 1978 
Re: No. 76-1310, Houchins v. KQED, Inc . 
Dear John, 
Try as I may, I cannot bring myself 
to agree that a county sheriff is constitutionally 
required to open up a jail that he runs to the 
press and the public . Accordingly, I shall not 
be able to subscribe to the opinion you have cir-
culated, affirming the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals. 
My tentative view, which may not 
stand up, is that it would be permissible in this 
case to i ssue an injunction assuring press ac-
cess equivalent to existing public access, but 
not the much broader injunction actually issued 
by the District Court . I shall in due course cir-
culate an expression of these views . 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr . Justice Stevens 
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April 25, 1978 
Re: 76-131 0 Houchins v. KQED, Inc. 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
✓ 
I have devoted a substantial amount of time on 
a dissent in this case with some emphasis on systems of 
citizen oversight procedures which .exist in many states. 
Some have fallen into disuse., but these can be traced back 
to colonial days when all public institutions were subject 
to citizen surveillance. 
This approach, rather than pushy TV people interested 
directly in the sensational, is the way to a solution. I 
will be circulating my views in due course. I agree with 
Potter's view that media have a right of access but not 
beyond that of the public generally. 
lilzf3 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
- -.$)Ul'l"mtt <!fttttrl .of t4t ~h ;§ta:ftg 
Jra.g Jr:ttghtn. , . <!}. 2!lffeJl., 
May 19, 1978 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: 76-1310 Houchins v. KQED 
✓ 
Since John's opinion has been "in limbo" for 
some time, I have put my hand to an alternative, 
proposing reversal. 
I send it in "Wang draft" and in less than the 
final form I would circulate normally. If there is 
enough support for this result, I am willing to put 
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MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concu r ring in the -- .,_..... 
The First and Fourteenth Amendme nts do not guarant~ 
the public a right of access to information generated or ~ 
controlled by government, nor do they guarantee the press a ny -~) 
basic right of access superior to that of the public ~~ 
generally. 7he Constitution does no more than assure the 
public a nd the press equal access once government has opened 
its doors.~/ Accordingly, I agree substantially with what 
the opinion of the Chief Justice has to say on that score. 
We part company, however, in applying these 
abstractions to the facts of this case. Whereas he appea rs to 
view "equal access" as meaning access that is identical in all 
respects, I believe that the concept of equal access must be 
accord ed more flexibility in order to accommodate the practical 
di s tinctions between the pres s and the gener a l public. 
J~/.2,~~~ 
~~~. 
-----_-*_/ __ F_o_r_c_e_s and f actors other th an the Cons 6 u~~ 
mus~ determine what g<?vernment--held· data ~re to. be rn~de & ~ ~ 
available to the public. See, e.g., New York Time s Co. v 
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 7 23-::"}30 -(cons 1.1rring opinion) . 




foreclose the possibility of further relief for KQED on 
remand. In my view, the availability and scope of future 
permanent injunctive relief must depend upon the extent of 
access then permitt e d the p11blic, and the decree must be f r amed 
to accommodate equitably the constitutional role of the press 
and the i n stitutional requi reme n ts of the jail. 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
-
Dear Potter: 
-j)n.pumt (!+ll1lrl of tqt ~b j)taftg 
:Jlfu!pnghtn. !l- (!+. 2llffe'!, 
May 23, 1978 
Re: 76-1310 Houchins v. KQED 
✓ 
In light of your concurring opinion I will add 
some thoughts along the following lines: there are 
literally dozens of people -- law teachers, judges, 
penologists, writers, lawyers--. who tour prisons (as 
I did for 25 years in Europe and U.S.A.). Many of 
them write books, articles, or give lectures or a 
combination. I'm sure you will agree they have the 
same rights as a TV reporter doing a "documentary." 
Can they have greater First Amendment rights than 
these others whose form and certainty of communications 
is not so fixed? 
This, of course, goes to the "debate" on the "special" 
status of those who regularly or semi-regularly use 
newspapers or broadcast facilities and reach a larger 
audience than a Law School, a Judicial Conference, or a 
Conference on Corrections. I do not believe First 
Amendment rights can be circumscribed by the scope of 
the audience. If so, the early pamphleteers who could 
afford only 100 sheets were "suspect." 
I will try to be along soon with this enlargement 
with some emphasis on the fact that a team of TV 
cameramen (camera-persons!) will tend to produce far 
more disruption than the serious student or judge, 
lawyer, or penologist who wants to exercise First 
Amendment rights with a s 7 ewhat different objective. 
{Af)ar 
Mr. Justice Stewart 
cc: The Conference 
- -
;§npr.eme (lfitttrl d t!f.e ~th ~tltlts 
jiras!p:ttghm. ~- <!f. 2llffe'l~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST 
✓ 
May 24, 1978 
Re: No. 76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED 
Dear Chief: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
~ · 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
- -
~iqrrentt QJitttrl af tfyt ~th ~faug 
jhtsfying~ ~- QJ. 2llffe'1-~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTI CE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
June 12, 1978 
No. 76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED 
Dear Chief: 
Although I was a solid join with respect to your earlier 
draft, your circulation of June 9th (second draft) leaves me 
much less convinced. While I am perfectly willing to join in 
any accommodation as to language or minor points, the para-
graph beginning at the bottom of page 14 and ending at the 
top of page 15, and the new material at the top of page 8, 
both seem to me to weaken the thrust of your opinion. I will 
certainly not jump ship on you at this point, and would be 
happy to offer any suggestions that might both satisfy me and 
accomplish your goal of getting a Court; but with the language 
which I have referred to in its present state, I think you will 
have to mark me as "dubitante", as FF would have said. 
Sincerely, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMBERS OF" 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
Dear Chief, 
- -
~1tpumt <!fourt of t!rt ~th j;taua 
~aatrmgnm. tfl. <!f. 20ffeJ!., 
Re: 76-1310 - Houchins v . KQED 
June 
If the First Amendment requires a government to turn 
over information about its prisons on the demand of the press 
or to open its files and properties not only to routine in-
spections but for filming and public display, it would be 
difficult to contain such an unprecedented principle. I would 
suppose there are many government operations that are as im-
portant for the public to know about as prisons, or more so; 
yet I cannot believe that the press has a constitutional right 
to be at every administrator's elbow and to read all of his 
mail. To start down this road would surely necessitate working 
out a series of constitutionally authorized exemptions from the 
duty of state governments to submit themselves to daily or 
periodic auditing by the press. 
This is not to say that the availability of accurate 
information about government is not essential or to deny the 
important role of the press in this regard. But I resist 
taking over what is essentially a legislative task and by 
reinterpreting the First Amendment assigning to ourselves and 
other courts the duty of determining whether the state and 
Federal Governments are making adequate disclosures to the 
press. 
I join your opinion and hope that it connnands a majority. 
Sincerely yours, 
~ 
The Chief Justice 
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MR. JUSTICE STEVENS, dissenting. 
The Court holds that the scope of press access to the San:ta 
Rita jail required by the preliminary injunction issued against 
petitioner is inconsistent with the holding in Pell v. Procunier, 
417 U. S. 817, 834, that "newsmen have no constitutional right 
of access to prisons or their inmates beyond that afforded the 
general public" and therefore the injunction was an abuse of 
the District Court's discretion. I disagree. 
Respondent KQED, Inc .. has televised a number of programs 
about prison conditions and prison inmates, and its reporters 
have been granted access to various correctional facilities in 
the San Francisco Bay area, including San Quentin State 
Prison, Soledad Prison and the San Francisco County Jails at 
San Bruno and San Francisco, to prepare program material. 
They have taken their cameras and recording equipment 
inside the walls of those institutions and interviewed inmates. 
No disturbances or other problems have occurred on those· 
occasions. 
KQED has also reported newsworthy events involving the· 
Alameda County Jail in Santa Rita, including a 1972 newscast 
reporting a decision of the United States District Court finding· 
that the "shocking and debasing conditions which prevailed" 
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man or beast as a matter of law.' ' ' On March 31 , 1975, KQED 
reported the suicide of a prisoner in the Greystone portion of 
the SaJ1ta Rita jail. That program also carried a statement by 
a psychiatrist assigned to Santa Rita to the effect that condi-
tions in the Greystone facility were responsible for illnesses of 
inmates. 2 Petitioner's disagreement with that conclusion wa& 
reported on the same newscast. 
KQED requested permission to visit and photograph the 
area of the jail where the suicide occurred. Petitioner refused, 
advising KQED that it was his policy not to permit any access 
to the jail by the news media. This policy was · also invoked 
by petitioner to deny subsequent requests for access to the jail 
in order to cover news stories about conditions and alleged 
incidents within the facility." Except for a carefully super-
vised tour in 1972, the news media were completely excluded 
from the inner portions of the Santa Rita jail until after this 
action was commenced: :Moreover. the prison rules provided 
that all outgoing mail. except letters to judges and lawyers, 
would be inspected; the rules also prohibited any mention 
in outgoing correspondence of the names or actions of any 
correctional officers. 
Respondents KQED, and the Alameda and Oakland branches 
of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored 
People,5 filed their complaint for equitable relief on June 17, 
1 See Brenneman v. Madison, 343 F . Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972). 
Based on a personal visit to the facility, Judge Zirpoli reached the 
"inescapable conclusion that Greystone should be razed to the ground." 
2 The psychiatrist wa,; discharged after the teleca:;t,. 
3 Access was denied , for example, to cover stories of alleged gang rapes 
and poor physical conditions within the jail, Tr. 208, and of recent escapes 
from the jail, Tr. 135-136. 
4 A previous sheriff had conducted one " press tour'' in 1972, attended 
by reporters and cameramen. But the facility had been "freshly scrubbed'' 
for the tour and the reporters were forbidden, to ask any questions of the 
inmates they encountered (App. 16-17) . 
. "The NAACP alleged a "special concern with conclitions at Santa Rita 
because the prisoner population a.t the jail is disproportionately black, and 
-
io-1310-DISSENT 
HOUCHINS v. KQED, INC. 
-
3 
1975. The complaint alleged that petitioner had provided no 
"means by which the public may be informed of conditions 
prevailing in Greystone or by which prisoners' grievances may 
reach the public." It further alleged that petitioner's policy 
of "denying KQED and the public" access to the jail facility 
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Consti-
tution and requested the court to enjoin petitioner "from 
excluding KQED news personnel from the Greystone cells and 
Santa Rita facilities and generally preventing full and accurate 
news coverage of the conditions prevailing therein." App. 6--7. 
With the complaint, respondents filed a motion for a prelim-
inary injunction, supported by affidavits of representatives of 
the news media, the Sheriff of San Francisco County, and the 
attorney for respondents. The affidavits of the news media 
representatives and the sheriff described the news coverage in 
other penal institutions and uniformly expressed the opinion 
that such coverage had no harmful consequences and in fact 
served a significant public purpose." 
In a letter to the County Board of Supervisors dated two 
days after this suit was instituted, petitioner proposed a pilot 
public tour program. He suggested monthly tours for 25 
the members of the NAACP depend on the news media for information 
about conditions in the jail so that they can meaningfully participate in 
the current public debate on jail conditions in Alameda County." Com-
plaint Paragraph 3. 
Since no specia.J relief was requested by or granted to the NAACP, the 
parties have focused on the claim of KQED. 
6 The sheriff had a master's degree in criminology from the University 
of California, at Berkeley and 10 yea.rs experience in la.w en,forcement , 
with the San Francisco Police Department. As sheriff he had genera.I 
supervision and control over the jail facilities in San Francisco. He 
expressed the "opinion, based on my education and experience in law 
enforcement and jail administration, that such programs made an impor-
tant contribution to public understanding of jails and jail conditions. In 
my opinion jails are public institutions and t.he public has a right to know 
what is being done with their tax dollars being spent on jail facilities an,d. 
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persons, with the first tentatively scheduled for July 14. The 
tours. however. would not include the cell portions of Grey-
stone and would not allow any use of cameras or communication 
with inmates. The Board approved six such tours. Peti-
tioner then filed his answer and supporting a.flidavit explaining 
why he had refused KQED access to the jail and identifying 
the recent changes in policy regarding access to the jail and 
communication between inmates and persons on the outside. 
Petitioner stated that if KQED's request had been granted, he 
would have felt obligated to honor similar requests from other 
representatives of the press and this could have disrupted 
mealtimes. exercise times, visiting times. and court appear-
ances of inmates.' He pointed out that the mail regulations 
had recently been amended to delete a prohibition against 
mentioning the names or actions of any correctional officers. 
,vith respect to the scope of the proposed tours. petitioner 
explained that the use of cameras would be prohibited because 
it would not be possible to prevent 25 persons with cameras 
from photographing inmates and security operations. More-
over, communication with inmates would not be permitted 
because of excessive time consumption, "problems with con-
trol" of inmates and visitors, and a belief "that interviews 
would be excessively unwieldy.' ' 8 
An evidentiary hearing on the motion for a preliminary 
injunction was held after the first four guided tours had taken 
place. The evidence revealed the inadequacy of the tours as a 
means of obtaining information about the inmates and their 
conditions of confinement for transmission to the public. The 
7 In contrast to the floodgate concerns expressed by petitioners, the 
Information Officer at San Quentin testified that after the liberalization of 
access rules at that institution media requests to enter the facility actually 
declined. Tr. 152. This testimony may suggest that the mere existence 
·of inflexible access barriers generates a concern that conditions within the 
·closed institution reqmre especially close scrutiny. 
s App., at '.24. 
-
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tours failed to enter certain areas of the jail.~ They afforded 
no opportunity to photograph conditions within the facility, 
and the photographs which the County offered for sale to tour 
visitors omitted certain jail characteristics, such as catwalks 
above the cells from which guards can observe the inmates.1.0 
The tours provided no opportunity to question randomly 
encountered inmates about jail conditions. Indeed, to the 
extent possible inmates were kept out of sight during the tour, 
preventing the tour visitors from obtaining a realistic picture 
of the conditions of confinement within the jail. In addition, 
the fixed scheduling of the tours prevented coverage of news-
worthy events at the jail. 
Of most importance, all of the remaining tours were com-
pletely booked and there was no assurance that any tour would 
be conducted after December of 1975. The District Court 
found that KQED had no access to the jail and that the broad 
restraints on access were not required by legitimate penological 
interests. 11 
9 The tour did not include Little Greystone, which was the subject of 
reports of beatings, ra.pes and poor conditions, or the disciplinary cells. 
10 There were also no photos of the women's cells, of the "safety cell," 
of the "disciplinary cells," or of the interior of Little Greystone. In addi-
tion, the photograph of the dayroom omits the television monitor that 
maintains continuous observation of the inmates and the open urinals. 
11 "Sheriff Houchins admitted that because Santa Rita has never experi-
mented with a more liberal press policy than that presently in existence, 
there is no record of press disturbances. Furthermore, the Sheriff has no 
recollection of hearing of any disruption caused by the media at other 
penal institutions. Nevertheless Sheriff Houchins stated that he feared 
that invasion of inmates' privacy, creation of jail 'celebrities,' and threats 
of jail securit,y would result from a more liberal press policy. While such 
£ea.rs are not groundless, convincing testimony was offered that such fears 
can be substantially allayed. 
"As to the inmates' priva.cy, the media representa,tives commonly obtajn 
written consent from those inmates who are interviewed and/or photo-
·graphed, and coverage of inmates is never provided without their full 
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The District Court thereafter issued a preliminary injunc-
tion, enjoining petitioner "from denying to KQED news 
personnel and responsible representatives of the news media 
access to the Santa Rita facilities, including Greystone, at 
reasnnable times and hours," or from preventing such repre-
sentatives "from utilizing photographic and sound equipment 
or from utilizing inmate interviews in providing full and 
accurate coverage of the Santa Rita facilities." The court, 
however, recognized that petitioner should determine the 
specific means of implementing the order and, in any event, 
should retain the right to deny access when jail tensions or 
other special circumstances require exclusion. 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed, holding that the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in framing the preliminary injunction under review.12 
MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, acting as Circuit Justice. stayed the 
mandate and in his opinion on the sta.y application fairly 
stated the legal issue we subsequently granted certiorari to 
decide: 
"The legal issue to be raised by applicant's petition for 
certiorari seems quite clear. If the 'no greater access' 
publicity, consent <;an be obtained not only from such inmates but also 
from their counsel. Jail 'celebrities' are not likely to emerge as a result, 
of a random intefview policy. Regarding jail security, any cameras and 
equipment brought into the jail can- be searched. While Sheriff Houchins 
expressed c~ncern that photographs of elect ronic locking devices could be 
en larged and stt;died in order to facilitate escape plans, he admitted that 
the inmates t hemselves can study and sketch the locking devices. Most 
importantly , there was substantia l testimony to the effect that ground 
rules laid down by jail administrators, such as a ban on photographs of 
security devices, are consistently respected by the media. 
"Thus, upon reviewing the evidence concerning the present, media policy 
at Santa Rita, the Court finds the plaintiffs have demonstrated irreparable 
injury, absence of an adequate remedy at law, probability of success on 
the merits, a favorable public interest, and a balance of hardships which 
must be struck in plaintiffs' favor." App., at 69. 
12 546 F. 2d 284 (1976) . 
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doctrine of Pell and Saxbe applies to this case, the Court 
of Appeals and the District Court were wrong, and the 
injunction was an abuse of discretion. If, on the other 
hand, the holding in Pell is to be viewed as impliedly 
limited to the situation where there already existed sub-
stantial press and public access to the prison, then Pell 
and Sa.1;be are not necessarily dispositive, and review by 
this Court of the propriety of the injunction, in light of 
those cases, would be appropriate, although not neces-
sary." 429 U. S. 1341, 1344. 
For two reasons, which shall be discussed separately, the 
decisions in Pell and SO,Xbe do not control the propriety of the 
District Court's preliminary injunction. First, the unconsti-
tutionality of petitioner's policies which gave rise to this 
litigation does not rest on the premise that the press has a 
greater right of access to information regarding prison condi-
tions than do other members of the public. Second, relief 
tailored to the needs of the press may properly be awarded to 
a representative of the press which is successful in proving that 
it has been harmed by a constitutional violation and need not 
await the grant of relief to members of the general public who 
may also have been injured by petitioner's unconstitutional 
access policy but have not yet sought to vindicate their rights. 
I 
This litigation grew out of petitioner 's refusal to allow 
representatives of the press access to the inner portions of the 
Santa Rita facility. Following those refusals and the institu-
tion of this suit, certain remedial action was taken by peti-
tioner. The mail censorship was relaxed and an experimental 
tour program was initiated. As a preliminary matter, there-
fore, it is necessary to consider the relevance of the actions 
after March 31. 1975, to the question whether a constitutional 
viola,tion had occurred. 
It is well settled that a defendant's corrective action in 
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,does not deprive the court of power to decide whether thti 
-previous course of conduct was unlawful. See United Stateg 
v. W. 1'. Gra.nt Co., 345 U. S. 629 and cases cited, at 632-633.13 
'The propriety of the court's exercise of that power in this case 
is apparent. When this suit was filed, there were no public 
tours. Petitioner enforced a policy of virtually total exclusion 
of both the public and the press from those areas within the 
'Santa Rita jail where the inmates were confined. At that time 
petitioner also enforced a policy of reading all inmate corre-
spondence addressed to persons other than lawyers and judges 
and censoring those portions that related to the conduct of the 
·guards who controlled their daily existence. Prison policy as 
well as prison walls significantly abridged the opportunities for 
communication of information about the conditions of confine-
ment in the Santa Rita facility to the public.14· Therefore, 
13 MorPover, alorig with the powt'r to decide the merits, the Court's 
power to grant injunctive relief survives the discontinuance of illegal con-
duct. "It is the duty of the courts to beware of efforts to defeat injunc-
tive relief by protestations of repentance and reform, especially when 
a.bandonment seems timed to ru1ticipa.te suit, and there is a probability of 
-resumption." United States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U. S. 326, 
'333. When the District Court issued the preliminary injunction, there was 
no assurance that the experimental public tours would continue beyond 
the next month. Thus, it would certainly have been reasonable for the 
court to assume that, absent injunctive relief, tbe access to t1ie inner por-
tions of the Santa Rita facility would soon be reduced to its prelitiga.tion 
level. 
11 Thus, when this suit was filed, there existed no opportunity for out-
siders to observe the living conditions of the inmates at Santa. Rita. And· 
the mail regulations prohibited sta.tements about the character of the 
treatment of prisoners by correctional officers. 
I cannot agree with petitioner that the inmates' visitation and telephone 
privilege,;; were rea:,;onable alternative means of informing the public 
at large about conditions within SaJ1ta Rita. Neither offered an oppor-
tunity to observe those conditions. Even if a member of the genera.! pub-
lic or a representativ~ of the press were fortunate enough to obtain the 
name of aJ1 inmate to visit, access to the facility would not have included 
the inmate's place of confinement. The jail regulatfons do] not indicate · 
-
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even if there would not have been any constitutional violation 
had the access policies adopted by petitioner following com-
mencement of this litigation been in effect all along, it was 
appropriate for the District Court to decide whether the 
restrictive rules in effect when KQED first requested access 
were constitutional. 
In Pell v. Procunier, 417 U. S. 817, 834, the Court sta.ted 
that "newsmen have no constitutional right of access to prisons 
or their inmates beyond that afforded the general public." 
But the Court has never intimated that a nondiscriminatory 
policy of excluding entirely both the public and the press from 
access to information about prison conditions would avoid 
constitutional scrutiny.rn Indeed, Pell itself strongly suggests 
the contrary. 
that an inmate in the m1mmum security portion of the jail may enlist 
the aid of Social Service Officers to telephone the press or members of the 
general public to complain of the conditions of confinement. App. 38. 
Even if a maximum security inmate may make collect telephone calls, it 
is unlikely that a member of the general public or representative of the 
press would accept the charges, especia.lly without prior knowledge of the 
ca.ll's communicative purpose. 
Although sentenced prisoners may not be interviewed under any cir-
cumstances, pret,ria1 detainees may, according to pet.itioner, be interviewed 
with the consents of the inmates, defense coun,.gel and prosecutor and with 
an order from the court. Not only would such an interview take place 
outside the confines of the jail, but the requirement of a court order makes 
this a patently inadequate means of keeping the public informed about the 
jail and its inmates. 
Finally, petitioner suggests his willingness to provide the press with 
information regarding the release of prisoners which, according to peti-
tioner, would permit interviews of former prisoners regarding the condi-
tions of their recent confinement. This informal offer was apparently only 
made in response to respondents' lawsuit. Moreover, it too fails to afford 
the public any opportunity to observe the conditions of confinement. 
Hence, the means available at the time this suit was instituted for 
informing the general public about conditions in the Santa Rita jail were,, 
:as a practical matter, nonexistent. 
1 5 ln Zemel, v. Rusk, 381 U. S. 1, 17, the Court said: 
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in Procunier v. Martinez, supra, the Court invalidated prison 
regulations authorizing excessive censorship of outgoing inmate 
correspondence because such censorship abridged the rights of 
the intended recipients. See also Morales v. Schmidt, 489 F. 
2d 1335, 1346 n. 8 (CA7 1973). So here, petitioner's preliti-
gation prohibition on mentioning the conduct of jail officers in 
outgoing correspondence must be considered an impingement 
on the noninmate correspondent's interest in receiving the 
intended communication. 
In addition to safeguarding the right of one individual to 
receive what another elects to communicate, the First Amend-
ment serves an essential societal function. 20 Our system of 
self-government assumes the existence of an informed citi-
zenry.21 As Madison wrote: 
"A popular Government, without popular information 
or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce or 
a tragedy; or perhaps both. Knowledge will forever gov-
20 "What is a,t stake here is the societal function of the First Amend-
ment in preserving free ptiblic discussion of governmental affairs. No 
aspect of that constitutional guarantee is more treasured than its protec-
tion of the ability of our people through free and open debate to consider 
and resolve their own destiny. . . . It embodies our Nation's commit-
ment to popular self-determination and our abiding faith that the surest 
course for developing sound national policy lies in a. free exchange of views 
as public issues. And public debate must not only be unfettered; it must 
aJso be informed. For that. reason this Court has repeatedly stated that 
First Amendment concerns encompass the receipt of information and ideas 
as well as the right of free expression." Saxbe v. Wa.shington Post Co., 
417 U.S. 843, 862-863 (PowELL, J., dissenting) . 
21 See A. Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 
26 (1948) : 
"Just as far as ... foe citizens who are to decide an issue a.re denied 
acquaintance with information or opinion or doubt or disbelief or criti-
cism which is relevant to that issue, just so far the result must be ill-
considered, ill-balanced planning, for the general good. It is that mutila-
tion of the thinking process of the community against which the Fir,st. 
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ern ignorance. And a people who mean to be their own 
governors, must arm themselves with the power knowledge 
gives." Writings of James Madison 103 (G. Hurst ed. 
1910) . 
It is not sufficient, therefore, that the channels of communica-
tion be free of governmental restraints. Without some pro-
tection for the acquisition of information about the operation 
of public institutions such as prisons by the public at large, the 
process of self-governance contemplated by the Framers would 
be stripped of its substance.22 
For that reason information-gathering is entitled to some 
measure of constitutional protection . See, e. g., BranzlYurg v. 
Ha.yes, 408 U.S. 665, 681; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 833.23 
As this Court's decisions clearly indicate, however, this protec-
tion is not for the private benefit of those who might qualify 
as representatives of the "press" but to insure that the citizens 
are fully informed regarding matters of public interest- and 
importance. 
In Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U. S. 233, represent-
atives of the "press" challenged a state tax on the advertising 
2 2 Admittedly, the right to receive or acquire information is not &-pecifi-
cally mentioned in the Constitu tion. But "the protection of the Bill of 
Rights goes beyond the specific guarantees to protect from . . . abridge-
ment those equally fundamental personal rights necessa ry to,· make the 
express guarantees fully meaningful. . . . The dissemination of ideas can 
accomplish nothing if otherwise willing a~herents are not free to receive 
and consider them. It would be a barren marketplace of ideas that had 
only sellers and no buyers." Lamont v. Postmaster General,, 381 U. S., at 
380 (BRENNAN, J ., concurring) . It would be an even more barren market-
place that had willing bu)rers and sellers and no meaningful information 
to exchange. 
23 See also Branzburg v. Hayes, supra, at 727 (STEWART, J. , dissenting): 
" No less important to the news dissemination process is the gathering of 
information. News must not be unnecessarily cut off at its source, for 
without freedom to acquire information the right to publish would be 
impermissibly compromised. Accordingly, a . -right , to gather news, of 
;some dimensions, must exist ." 
-
76-1310-DISSENT 
HOUCHINS v. KQED, INC. 
-
15 
revenues of newspapers. In the Court's words, the issue raised 
by the tax went "to the heart of the natural right of the 
members of an organized society, united for their common 
good, to impart and acquire information about their common 
interests." Id., at 243. The opinion described the long struggle 
in England against the stamp tax and tax on advertisements--
the so-called "taxes on knowledge": 
"[I]n the adoption of the ... [taxes] the dominant and 
controlling aim was to prevent, or curtail the opportunity 
for, the acquisition of knowledge by the people in respect 
of their governmental affairs. . . . The aim of the strug-
gle :[against those taxes] was ... to establish and pre-
serve the right of the English people to full information in 
respect of the doings or misdoings of their government. 
Upon the correctness of this conclusion, the very charac-
terizations of the exactions as 'taxes on knowledge' sheds 
a flood of corroborative light. In the ultimate, an in-
formed and enlightened public opinion was the thing at 
stake." Id., at 247. 
Noting the familiarity of the Framers with this struggle, 
the Court held: 
"[S]ince informed public opinion is the most potent of 
all restraints upon misgovernment, the suppression or 
abridgement of the publicity afforded by a free press 
cannot be regarded otherwise than with grave concern. 
The tax involved here is bad ... because, in light of its 
history and its present setting, it is seen to be a deliberate 
and calculated device . . . to limit the circulation of 
information to which the public is entitled in virtue of the 
constitutional guaranties." Id., at 250. 
A recognition that the "underlying right is the right of the 
public generally" 24 is also implicit in the doctrine that "news-
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men have no constitutional right of access to prisons or their 
inmates beyond that afforded the general public." Pell v. 
Procunier, supra, 417 U.S., at 834. In Pell it wa.s unnecessary 
to consider the extent of the public's right of access to informa-
tion regarding the prison and its inmates in order to adjudicate 
the press claim to a particular form of access, since the record 
demonstrated that the flow of information to the public, both 
directly and through the press, was adequate to survive consti-
tutional cha.llenge; institutional considerations justified deny-
ing the single, additional mode of access sought by the press in 
that case. 
Here, in contrast, the restrictions on access to the inner 
portions of the Santa Rita -jail that existed on the date this 
litigation commenced concealed from the general public the 
conditions of confinement within the facility. The question is 
whether petitioner's policies, which cut off the flow of informa-
tion at its source, abriclgea the public's right to be informed 
about those conditions. 
The answer to that question does not depend upon the 
degree of public disclosure which should attend the operation of 
most governmental activity. Such matters involve questions 
of policy which generally must be resolved by the political 
branches of government.25 Moreover, there are unquestion-
ably occasions when governmental activity may properly be 
carried on in complete secrecy. For example, the public and 
the press are commonly excluded from "grand jury proceed-
25 In United States v. Nixon, 418 U. S. 683, 705 n. 15, we pointed out 
that the Founders themselves followed a policy of confidentiality: 
"There is nothing novel about governmental confidentiality. The meet-
ings of the Constitutional Convention in 1787 were conducted in complete 
privacy. 1 M. Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, 
pp xi-xxv (1911) . Moreover, all records of those meetings were sealed 
for more than 30 years after the Convention. See 3 Stat. 475, 15th Cong., 
1st Sess., Res. 8 ( 1818). Most of the Framers acknowledged that without 
secrecy no constitution of the kind that was developed could have been . 
written.. C .. Warren , The Making of the Constitution 134-139 (1937) ." 
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ings, our own conferences, [and] the meetings of other official 
bodies gathering in executive session .... " Branzburg v. 
Hayes, 408 U. S., at 684; Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S., at 834."'0 
In addition , some functions of government----essential to 
the protection of the public and indeed our country's vital 
interests-necessarily require a large measure of secrecy, sub-
ject to appropriate legislative oversight. 2 ' In such situa.tions 
the reasons for withholding information from the public are 
both apparent and legitimate. 
In this case, however, "[r] espondents do not assert a right 
to force disclosure of confidential information or to invade in 
any way the decisionmaking processes of governmental offi-
cials." 28 They simply seek an end to petitioner's policy of 
concealing prison conditions from the public. Those condi-
tions are wholly without claim to confidentiality. While prison 
,n In the case of grand jury proceedings, for example, the secrecy rule 
has been justified on several grounds: 
" ( 1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contem-
plated; (2) to insure the utmost freedom to the gra.nd jury in its delibera-
tions, and to prevent persons subject to indictment or their friends from 
importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of perjury or 
tampering with the witnesses who may testify before grand jury and later 
appear at the trial of those indicted by it; ( 4) to encourage free and 
untrammeled djsclosures by persons who have infonnation with respect to 
the commission of crimes; ( 5) to protect innocent accused who is exoner-
ated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and 
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of 
guilt." United States v. Procter & Gamble, 356 U. S. 677, 681 n. 6. 
27 In United States v. Nixon, supra, we a11:10 recognjzed the valid need 
for prot~ction of communications between high Government officials and 
those who advise and assist. them in the performance of their ma.njfold 
duties, explaining tha.t '·the importance of this confidentiality is too plain 
to require further discussion. Human experience teaches that those who 
expect public dissemination of their remarks may well temper ca.ndor 
with a concern for appearances and for their own interests to the detri-
ment of the decisionmaking process." / d., at 705. 
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officials have an interest in the time and manner of public 
acquisition of information about the institutions they admin-
ister, there is no legitimate, penological justification for 
concealing from citizens the conditions in which their fellow 
citizens are being confined.'"0 
The reasons which militate in favor of providing special 
protection to the flow of information to the public about 
prisons relate to the unique function they perform in a demo-
cratic society. Not only are they public institutions; financed 
with public funds and administered by public servants; 30 
they are an integral component of the criminal justice system. 
The citizens confined therein are temporarily, and sometimes 
permanently, deprived of their liberty as a result of a trial 
which must conform to the dictates of the Constitution. By 
express command of the Sixth Amendment the proceeding 
must be a "public trial. " ,n It is important not only that the 
trial itself be fair, but also that the community at large have 
confidence in the integrity of the proceeding.02 That public 
29 The Court in Saxbe not<>d that "'prisons are institutions where pub-
lic access is generally limited.'" 417 U. S., at 849 ( citation omitted) . 
This truism reflects the fact that there are legitimate penological inter-
ests served by regulating access, e. g., security and confinement. But con-
cea.ling prison conditions from the public is not one of those legitimate 
objectives. 
30 "The administration of the:;e institutions, the effectiveness of their 
rehabilitative programs, the conditions of confinement that they maintain, 
and the experiences of the individuals incarcerated therein are all matters 
of legitima.te societal interest and concern." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 
supra, 417 U.S .. at 861 (PowELL, .J., dis:;enting) . 
31 " In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en joy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and · 
·cause of the accusa tions . ... " U.S. Const., Amend. VI. 
32 "The right t-0 a public trial is not only to protect the accused but to 
protect as much t he public's right to kn,ow what goes on when men's lives 
and liberty are at stake . ... " L ewis v. Peyton, 352•F. 2_d 791; 792 (CA4 · 
1965) . See also In re Oliver, 333 U._ S. 25~-, 270: : "The knowledge that · 
-
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interest survives the judgment of conviction and appropriately 
carries over to an interest in how the convicted person is 
treated during his period of punishment and hoped-for rehabil-
itation. While a ward of the State and subject to its stern 
discipline, he retains constitutional protections against cruel 
and unusual punishment, see, e. g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U. S. 
97, a protection which may derive more practical support from 
access to information about prisons by the public than by 
occasional litigation in a busy court. 'l 3 
Some inmates-in Santa Rita, a substantial number-are 
pretrial detainees. Though confined pending trial, they have 
not been convicted of an offense against society and are 
entitled to the presumption of innocence. Certain penological 
objectives, i. e., punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation, 
which are legitimate in regard to convicted prisoners, are inap-
plicable to pretrial detainees.a, Society has a special interest 
in ensuring that unconvicted citizens are treated in accord with 
their status. 
In this case, the record demonstrates that both the public 
and the press had been consistently denied any access to the 
every criminal trial is subject to contemporaneous review in the forum of 
public opinion is an effective restraint on possible abuse of judicial power:" 
3 :i In fact, conditions within the Greystone portion of the Santa Rita 
facility had been found to constitute cruel arid unusual punishment. 
Brenneman v. Madigan, 343 F. Supp. 128, 132-133 (ND Cal. 1972). The 
public's interest in ensuring that these conditions ha,ve been remedied is 
apparent. For, in finru analysis, it is the citizens who bear responsibility 
for the treatment accorded those confined within penal institutions. 
34 "Incarceration after conviction is imposed to punish, to deter, and to 
rehabilitate the convict. . . . Some freedom to accomplish these ends must 
of necessity be afforded prison personnel. Conversely, where incarceration 
is imposed prior to conviction, deterrence, punishment,, and retribution 
are not legitimate functions of the incarcerating officials. Their role is 
but a temporary holding operation, and their necessa.ry freedom of action 
is concomitantly diminished. . . . Punitive measures in stich a contaxt a.re 
out of harmony with the presumption of ll\nocence." Anderson v. Nasser, 
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inner portions of the Santa Rita jail, that there had been 
excessive censorship of inmate correspondence, and that there 
was no valid justification for these broad restraints on the flow 
of information. An affirmative answer to the question whether 
respondent established a likelihood of prevailing on the merits 
did not depend, in final analysis, on any right of the press to 
special treatment beyond that accorded the public at large. 
Rather, the probable existence of a constitutional violation 
rested upon the special importance of allowing a democratic 
community access to knowledge about how its servants were 
treating some of its members who have been committed to 
their custody. An official prison policy of concealing such 
knowledge from the public by arbitrarily cutting off the flow of 
information at its source abridges the freedom of speech and 
of the press protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to the Constitution." 5 
III 
Th e preliminary injunction entered by the District Court 
granted relief to KQED without providing any specific remedy 
for other members of the public. Moreover, it imposed duties 
on petitioner that may not be required by the Constitution 
itself. The injunction was not an abuse of discretion for 
either of these reasons. 
If a litigant can prove that he has suffered specific harm 
from the application of an unconstitutional policy, it is 
entirely proper for a court to grant relief tailored to his needs 
without attempting to redress all the mischief that the policy 
may have worked on others. Though the public and the press 
have an equal right to receive information and ideas, different 
"" When fund am ental freedoms of citizens have been at stake, the Court 
h~s recognized that aJ1 abridgement of those freedoms may follow from a 
wide v::i riety of governmental policies. See, e. g., American Communica-
tions Assn. v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 ; NAACP v. Alabama, 357 ·u : S. 449 ; 
Boyd v. United States,. 116 U . s·. 616 i' Grosjean v. American Press Co ., 297 
U. S. 233·. 
' ' - -
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methods of remedying a violation of that right may sometimes 
be needed to accommodate the special concerns of the one or 
the other. Preliminary relief could therefore appropriately be 
awarded to KQED on the basis of its proof of how it was 
affected by the challenged policy without also granting specific 
relief to the general public. Indeed, since our adversary 
system contemplates the adjudication of specific controversies 
between specific litigants, it would have been improper for the 
District Court to attempt to provide a remedy to persons who 
have not requested sepa.rate relief. Accordingly, even though 
the Constitution provides the press with no greater right of 
r ~cess to information than that possessed by the public at 
large. a preliminary injunction is not invalid simply because it 
awards special relief to a successful litigant which is a repre-
sentative of the press. 36 
Nor is there anything novel about injunctive relief which 
goes beyond a mere prohibition against repetition of previous 
unlawful conduct. In situations which a.re both numerous and 
varied the chancellor has required a wrongdoer to take affirma-
a« Moreover, the relief granted to KQED will redound to the benefit, of 
members of the public interested in obtaining information about condi-
tions in the Santa Rita jail. The press may have no greater constitutional 
right to information about prisons than that possessed by the genera.I pub-
li c. But when the press does acquire information and disseminate it to 
the public, it performs an important societal function. 
" In seeking out the news the press therefore acts as an agent of the pub-
li c at large. It is the means by which the people receive that free flow of 
information and ideas essential to intelligent self-government. By enabl-
ing the public to assert meaningful control over the political process, the 
press performs a critical function in effecting the societal purpose of the 
First Amendment." Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., supra, 417 U. S., a.t 
863-864 (POWELL, J., dissenting) . 
See abo Branzburg v. Hayes. supra, 408 U. S., at 726-727 (STEWART, J. , 
dissenting). 
In the context of fashioning a remedy for a violation of rights protected 
·by the First Amendment, consideration of the role of the press in our 
·~ciety is appropriate. 
• I I • -
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tive steps to eliminate the effects of a violation of law even 
though the law itself imposes no duty to take the remedial 
action decreed by the court. 37 It follows that if prison regula-
tions and policies have unconstitutionally suppressed informa-
tion and interfered with communication in violation of the 
First Amendment, the District Court has the power to require, 
at least temporarily, that the channels of communication be 
opened more widely than the law would otherwise require in 
order to let relevant facts, which may have been concealed, 
come to light. Whether or not final relief along the lines of 
that preliminarily awarded in this case would be "aptly tai-
lored to remedy the consequences of the constitutional viola-
tion ," Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 287, it is perfectly 
clear that the court had power to enter an injunction which 
was broader than a mere prohibition against illegal conduct. 
The Court of Appeals found no reason to question the· 
specific preliminary relief ordered by the District Court. Nor 
is it appropriate for this Court to review the scope of the 
order.38 The order was preliminary in character, and would 
have b~en subject to revision before the litigation rnac~ final 0 
conclus1011. 
I respectfully dissent. 
37 For an extensive discussion of this practice in the context of desegre-
gation decrees, see the Court 's opinion last Term in Milliken v. Bradley, 
433 U. S. 267. 
38 It should be noted, however, that the District Court was presented with 
substant ial evidence indicating that the u:;e of cameras and interviews with 
randomly selected in,mates neither jeopardized security nor threatened 
legitima.te penological interests in other prisons where such access was., 
_permitted.. See Proc1;.nier v. Martinez, supra, 416 U. S., at, 414 n. 14.~ 
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June 16, 1978 
Re: 76-1310 - Houchins v. KQED 
Dear Lewis: 
I have added the following at the end of 
n. 29 on p. 18 of the printed draft: 
"Nixon v. Warner Communications, Inc., 
✓ 
U.S. , decided this Term, does not 
suggest a contrary conclusion. The effect ~ 
of the Court's decision in that case was 
to limit the access by the electronic 
media to the Nixon tapes to that enjoyed 
by the press and the public at the time 
of the trial. That case presented 'no 
question of a truncated flow of information 
to the public.'" Id., at 
I hope this is acceptable. 
Respectfully, 
; \,L 
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name to your dissent. 
Sjncerely, 
joining vou is firm, 
you added a note aJ ong t _he ~Jines . of 
There may appear - to thP. casuaJ 
there is some tension between what I wr.ote in Nixon (see 
pp. J9-20) of the slip opinion) and what :r: agree with ; ln 
your fine opinion in this :.case. ~ ·· • • 
L. P. P. ;, Jr. 
...,- , 
Ho.bins 
adding, as a footnote at some appropriate place, 
substance of the following: 
In Nixon v. Warner Comumnications, Inc., No. 
76-944, decided this Term, the effect of the Court's 
decision was to limit the access by the electronic media to 
the Nixon tapes to that enjoyed by the press and the public 
at the time of the trial. That case is not relevant here 
as it involved an accommodation between the common law 
right of access to judicial records and the Presidential 
Recordings Act. Moreover, the Nixon case presented "no 
question of a truncated flow of information to the 
public.": Slip op., at 19. 
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Dear Chief: 
I am still with you. 
sincerely, r 
The Chief Justice 
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RE: No. 76-1310 Houchins v. KQED, Inc., et al. 
Dear John: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Stevens 







To: Mr. Justice Powell 
From: Jim Alt 
June 16, 1978 ✓ 
Re: Justice Stevens' dissent in No. 76-1310, Houchins v. 
KQED. 
I have compared the old and new versions of this opinion, 
checked with Justice Stevens' clerk, and concluded that 
there are no substantive changes. 
I also have reviewed pp. 19-20 of your opinion for 
the Court in No. 76-944, Nixon v. Warner Communications, 
Inc., attached hereto. Although I sense some tension 
between statements there to the effect that the press 
has no greater right of access to information - at least 
about a trial - than does the general public, that case 
easily is distinguishable from this one on two grounds. 
First, and to my mind most importantly, both the press 
and the public already had been given substantial access -to the contents of the tapes at issue in Nixon. As you . 
wrote, "There is no question of a truncated flow of 
information to the public." Slip op., at 19. Second, it 
could be argued that the district court had a countervail 
interest in controlling and keeping track of its exhibits 
that outweighed the press' interest in that particular 
form of access. 
nr 
Although I would be a little happier if Justice Stevens' 
opinion noted these distinctions, I think they are obvious 
disinterested 
enough that a / observer would conclude you have 
taken positions that are entirely consistent in the two cases. 
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